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Abstract
This study sought to describe Turkish defense offsets in foreign procurement.
Located at the epicenter of regions fraught with crisis, Turkiye is a secular, democratic,
liberal country sharing western moral values. With the tradition of its 1,000 years of
statehood, with its constitutional order and its strong armed forces, Turkiye is a center of
power that can affect the delicate balance of power in the region.
Offsets started to become an important way of obtaining industrial and
technological benefits when importing military equipment in the early and mid-1980s.
Offset deals remain an important aspect of Turkish arms import policy, and offset
applications in Turkish foreign procurement shows that offsets are likely to increase in
the foreseeable future. Consequently, the study of Turkish defense offsets is important.
The history of offsets is introduced for the background of this research. As a
major user of U.S. defense systems, Turkiye each year buys American weapons worth
more than $ 1 billion. So, U.S. offset policy is described as a main supplier. A history of
the offset policy in Turkiye and analysis of the application of the offset policy is
provided. The conclusion is reached that offsets might prove beneficial for development
of the Turkish defense industry, provided that the appropriate policy measures create a
defense industrial base capable of assimilating future offset benefits programs.
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OFFSETS IN INTERNATIONAL WEAPONS ACQUISITIONS:
THE TURKISH EXPERIENCE

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides an introduction to the topic of offsets and the use of offsets
by Turkiye. [Throughout this thesis, I will use ‘Turkiye’ instead of ‘Turkey’ since this is
the spelling preferred by the Turkish government]. It begins with background
information and definitions of offsets and other critical terms. The chapter will identify
the general issue, and the specific problem and the investigative questions for this
research effort. Finally, it closes with a discussion of the scope of the research and the
presentation plan for the remaining chapters.
1.2 Background
In 1986, a U.S. interagency group defined offsets as “industrial compensation
practices required as a condition of purchase in either government-to-government or
commercial sales of defense articles and/or defense services as specified in the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations” (Department of Commerce, 1998).
The concept of an offset, especially in projects requiring high technology such as
the defense or aerospace industries, is based on foreign currency inflow to compensate
for deficits that may arise in the balance of payments as a result of the payments to be
made in foreign currencies within the framework of the relevant projects being carried
out.

1

Offset agreements are agreements between the buying and selling countries as
conditions for military exports (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1990). The two types
of offsets are direct and indirect. Direct offsets include co-production, buybacks, directed
subcontracting, investments in defense firms, concessions, technology transfer and
licensed production. Direct offsets also mean involving the item being purchased.
Indirect offsets include procurement, investments in non-defense firms, trading of
commodities, and foreign defense related projects (U.S. General Accounting Office,
1994).
Offsets first occurred after the Second World War, as a result of the process of
coping with the economic difficulties encountered during reconstruction of Europe. In
the 1980s, parallel with the developments taking place in the world economy, the
importance of offsets in industrialized and developing countries has increased. In this
manner, the first significant application was realized by Netherlands, Denmark, Norway
and Belgium within the scope of the procurement of the F-16 aircraft in 1975.
These days, offsets are used as a method to increase the standards of quality and
productivity of the existing industries. Offsets are established through exports and are
used to create local content and to produce goods and services which are competitive in
the international arena. Offsets are also used as a tool by industrialized countries to
develop their defense industry and to augment their market shares.
Turkiye seeks advanced technologies by using offsets for her defense. In 1984,
offsets were pursued in an effort to minimize the deficits in the balance of payments
started in the defense industry by signing an agreement to co-produce the F-16 fighters
domestically. The offsets committed to by the American General Dynamics Company
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(GD), within the scope of the offset agreement regarding the F-16 fighters, are
implemented and supervised by the Ministry of National Defense (MOND). The offset
percentage was set at about 25% or $1 billion. (Throughout this thesis, all dollar values
are in then-year dollars -- A then-year dollar is a constant or base-year dollar that has
been either inflated or deflated using the appropriate weighted inflation index to show the
amount of money that will be (was) needed when the expenditures for goods and services
are (were) made.)
In exchange for the purchase of 160 F-16 aircraft, General Dynamics agreed to
allow the assembly of 152 of the aircraft in Turkiye using parts from U.S. and European
plants (those which co-produced parts for the sale to Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, and
Belgium), as well as from new Turkish plants co-owned by General Dynamics, General
Electric (GE), Turkish industry, and the Turkish government. General Dynamics also
agreed to provide about 800 million dollars' worth of non-defense-related offsets,
including investments in the Turkish hotel industry and in a thermal power plant project
(Schaffer, 1989).
Afterwards, with the acceptance of Law No. 3238 concerning the establishment of
Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (UDI) in 1985, UDI (known by its Turkish
acronym of SSM) has become responsible for the export of defense industry products and
for the coordination of offset trade. SSM is the only government agency in Turkiye
equipped with power to administer military offsets.
The Foreign Trade Undersecretariat, on the other hand, is responsible for offset
programs in nonmilitary procurements. Sometimes, it is possible to see some defense
related offset programs which are carried out by The Foreign Trade Undersecretariat. 12
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May 2000 the new directive which explains principles of offset implementations in the
Turkish Defense Industry procurements was submitted. This directive explains that the
Ministry of Defense (MSB) and the Undersecretariat of the Defense Industry (SSM) can
carry out offset programs in Turkiye. The offsets of the projects carried out by the MSB
Foreign Procurement Department Chairmanship within the framework of the Main
Procurement Agreements and/or the procurement agreements which require the obtaining
of offsets are under the responsibility of the MSB Foreign Procurement Department
Chairmanship and offsets of the projects carried out by the SSM are supervised under the
responsibility of the SSM. The SSM is the office for the coordination of all of the offset
implementations.
Currently, major SSM programs include the co-production of 145 attack
helicopters, worth nearly $4 billion; co-production of 1,000 main battle tanks, worth $7
billion; purchase of eight aerial early warning aircraft, worth $1.5 billion; co-production
of unmanned aerial vehicles, worth $250 million; upgrades of 900 U.S.-made M60 A1/3
tanks, worth nearly $900 million; and several smaller Navy requirements. Major ongoing
programs controlled by the Defense Ministry’s foreign procurement department include
Israel’s upgrade of Turkish F-4E jets, worth $630 million, and a plan to co-produce six
modern frigates, worth $1.5 billion (Bekdil, 2000a). Offset deals remain an important
aspect of Turkish arms import policy and offset applications in Turkish foreign
procurement shows that offsets are likely to increase in the foreseeable future.
Consequently, the study of Turkish defense offsets is important.
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1.3 Definition of Terms
While there are different definitions of offsets used by industry and government
for different purposes, for this study, offsets in defense trade are industrial compensation
practices required as a condition of purchase in either government-to-government or
commercial sales of defense articles and/or defense services as specified in the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations.
Listed below are offset definitions as outlined in the Federal Register and Offsets
in Military Exports (Department of Commerce, 1996)
Actual Value of an Offset:

An offset transaction measured in terms of dollars.

Co-production:

Overseas production based upon government-togovernment agreement that permits a foreign
government(s) or producer(s) to acquire the technical
information to manufacture all or part of a U.S. origin
defense article. It includes government-to government
licensed production. It excludes licensed production based
upon direct commercial arrangements by U.S.
manufacturers.

Countertrade:

In addition to the types of offsets defined above, various
types of commercial countertrade arrangements may be
required. A contract may include one or more of the
following mechanisms:

Barter:

A one-time transaction only, bound under a single contract
that specifies the exchange of selected goods or services for
another of equivalent value.

Counter-purchase: An agreement by the initial exporter to buy (or to find a
buyer for) a specific value of goods (often stated as a
percentage of the value of the original export) from the
original importer during a specified time period.
Compensation
(or Buy-Back):

An agreement by the original exporter to accept as full or
partial repayment products derived from the original
exported product.
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Credit Value of an Offset: The offset transaction value applied against the offset
agreement, which may be greater than the actual value of
the offset. Extra credit (i.e., defined through multipliers) is
sometimes earned as an incentive to perform some specific
offset, such as investment or technology transfer of
particular interest to the foreign government.
Direct Offsets:

Contractual arrangements that involve defense articles and
services referenced in the sales agreement for military
exports.

Indirect Offsets:

Contractual arrangements that involve goods and services
unrelated to the exports referenced in the sales agreement.

Licensed Production:

Overseas production of a U.S. origin defense article based
upon transfer of technical information under direct
commercial arrangements between a U.S. manufacturer and
a foreign government or producer.

Military Export Sales:

Exports that are either foreign military sales (FMS) or
commercial (direct) sales of defense articles and/or defense
services as defined by the Arms Export Control Act and
International Traffic in Arms Regulations.

Multiplier Effect:

A multiplier is used to increase the value of an offset
project when determining offset credit. For example, if an
offset project is valued at $1,000, a multiplier of 10 will
increase the amount of offset credit granted to $10,000.

Offsets:

Industrial compensation practices required as a condition of
purchase in either government-to-government or
commercial sales of defense articles and/or defense
services as defined by the Arms Export Control Act
(AECA) and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
(ITAR).

Offset Agreement:

A counter contract to a military export sale negotiated
separately between the foreign purchasers, usually a foreign
government, and the U.S. exporter as a condition of the
export sale. The offset agreement requires the U.S.
exporter to compensate the foreign purchaser with various
types of offsets.
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Offset Transaction:

An offset transaction is an actual delivery of an offset
against the outstanding balance of an existing offset
agreement.

Overseas Investment:

Investment arising from the offset agreement, taking the
form of capital invested to establish or expand a subsidiary
or joint venture in the foreign country.

Subcontractor Production: Overseas production of a part or component of a U.S.
origin defense article. The subcontract does not necessarily
involve license of technical information and is usually a
direct commercial arrangement between the U.S.
manufacturer and a foreign producer.
Technology Transfer:

Transfer of technology that occurs as a result of an offset
agreement and that may take the form of research and
development conducted abroad, technical assistance
provided to the subsidiary or joint venture of overseas
investment, or other activities under direct commercial
arrangement between the U.S. manufacturer and a foreign
entity.

1.4 Problem Statement
Turkiye, one of the fastest developing counties in the region, has required offset
agreements to boost her industrial economy while purchasing major equipment. Turkiye
views offsets as a benefit to both parties in defense arms deals. Without offsets, the
government would never have been able to acquire the technology to produce expensive
foreign weapon systems; offsets are considered as a way of doing business. Offset deals
remain an important aspect of Turkish arms importing policy and offset applications in
Turkish foreign procurements show that offsets are likely to increase in the foreseeable
future. Consequently, the study of Turkish defense offsets is important. This
investigation will examine why Turkiye uses offset agreements, under what
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circumstances the agreements are used, and what the issues and factors are that affect
offset programs.

1.5 Research Questions
There are some main features of offset deals. The promotion of the growth and
the development of high technology industries merit the transfer of advanced military
technology, creation or preservation of foreign exchange, the creation of jobs at the local
level, the achievement of competitive advantages, the promotion of investment in local
industry and of local value-added programs, and the access to new commercial
opportunities are some of the benefits of the transfer of international marketing expertise
and the global reach of large companies. The problem statement for this project is to
search for these main features or benefits specific to Turkish offset deals. This is
represented by the overall research question “How have offsets been used in Turkish
military acquisition in foreign procurements?”
Several investigative questions surround and support this issue:
1. What is the Turkish policy on offsets?
2. How and why did this policy developed?
3. What are the critical factors to be considered when evaluating an acquisition
for the use of offsets?
4. What are the specific examples of Turkish military acquisition projects where
offsets are employed?
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The research will answer each specific investigative question by focusing on the
offset experience of Turkiye, and some of her offset applications in light of the
information, which will be presented in Chapter III.

1.6 Scope/Limitations
This study seeks to describe Turkish defense offsets in foreign procurements and
will only consider Turkish military offset agreements, not the civilian ones. The
limitations of this study include:
1. The value of offset agreements will not be discussed. Turkish military
acquisition projects where offsets are employed will be considered as general
examples of her offset applications. Specific evaluation of specific offsets is
not the goal of this research.
2. This research will not discuss whether or not the government, Department of
Defense (DoD), or defense industry need to change their work system for
successful offset agreements. The focus of this research will be limited by
how offsets have been used in Turkish military acquisition in foreign
procurements.

1.7 Presentation Plan
Chapter II identifies the research methods to be used in this research effort as well
as any limitations of the methods. Chapter III presents an overview of the current
literature on the general concept of offsets, the international arms market, examples of
offset agreements and government offset policies. Chapter IV provides general
9

information about Turkiye, Turkish offset policy, and provides information about some
Turkish offset applications. Chapter V provides findings and recommendations about
offset applications in Turkiye.
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2. METHODOLOGY
2.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter describes the research design utilized to collect data for this study.
The methodologies used will be described first, followed by the data collection methods.
Next, justification for the methodologies will be discussed. Finally, the limitations of the
research methods will be addressed.

2.2 Research Design
Case study was the primary research methodology utilized. A case study is
problem-oriented and represents an intensive study of phenomena using a variety of data
sources and tools. This technique requires intensive analysis of either the research
subject (Lang, 1984), situations similar to the research problem (Zikmund, 1988), or
both. Researchers, however, have no standard procedures to follow. They must be
flexible and attempt to glean information and insights wherever they find them
(Zikmund, 1988). Case study requires a dissection and study of the particular subject.
This intensive study will yield explanations of the research subject or of similar subjects,
which can then be used for comparison.
One of the “tools” utilized in the case analysis was the historical method.
Historical research is often defined as the writing of an integrated narrative about some
aspect of the past based on critical analysis and synthesis of sources (Lang, 1984). As the
definition states, a detailed and extensive search of the available data is the first step in
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historical research. This data must then be evaluated and synthesized into an accurate
account of the subject under investigation. It is this review and analysis of the existing
literature which develops the theories and explanations about the research subject.
Another research tool that was used shares common characteristics with the
historical method. The documentary research technique was employed as a complement
to the historical method. Documentary research “tends to emphasize contemporary
sources and present-day issues. It can be thought of as cross-sectional rather than
longitudinal, where the data focus is on one point in time or a relatively short period of
time” (Lang, 1984). Other than this differing orientation, documentary research shares
the historical method’s steps of data collection, synthesis, and evaluation in an attempt to
explain the research subject.

2.3 Justification for Methodology
Case study is the primary research tool for this effort. The study of Turkish
offset applications is in its infancy. Consequently, the current base of knowledge of
offset agreements is a relatively new area of study and thus the existing knowledge base
is limited. However, this limitation should not discourage the exploration of this
important arena. Case analysis allows the researchers to delve further into the research
area in an effort to develop a more mature knowledge base. Obviously, contributing to
the existing pool of knowledge on a research topic will not only benefits the immediate
understanding of the subject, but it will also move future research towards survey and
statistical research methodologies. Case analysis also allows the researcher to compare
findings on a particular example to the existing knowledge base. Elements of the existing
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pool can then either be corroborated or challenged. New elements can also be expected
to be introduced. Additionally, case analysis provides direction to the research. As a
result of this effort, the study of Turkish offset applications is no longer purely
exploratory. Some data have been developed, and case analysis allows concentration on
specific issues.
Analysis of other specific countries' offset applications provided data directly
applicable to the research subject. Study of comparable or similar international programs
also proved valuable. “Even if situations are not directly comparable, a number of
insights can be gained and hypotheses suggested for future research” (Zikmund, 1988).
Study of the particular case as well as comparable or similar cases added to the
development of the research findings.
Historical and documentary research methods were used to obtain primary data.
These primary data were gathered from articles about Turkish acquisition, mostly
published in Defense News, The DISAM Journal, Turkish Daily News, and some official
publications of The Turkish Ministry of Defense (such as Offset Guidelines-1991 and
2000), and books about offset agreements. These sources established a solid foundation
of knowledge to build on. An intensive search and analysis of existing data on the
research problem was essential to investigate the dynamic arena of international weapon
acquisition. Historical research provided this foundation of existing knowledge on the
research subject. Consequently, the historical method was critical to gathering the
information, which already existed, on the research subject and synthesizing it into an
organized body of knowledge. Historical research provided a foundation and overview
upon which further study could be based.
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The documentary research method was essential to garner recent data on specifics
of the research subject. These specific research subjects are current Turkish Offset policy
and ways of application of offsets in some Turkish military acquisitions. The method
permitted a shift in orientation from historical research of past data to a more recent
review of the research subject. This move in orientation to an investigation of relatively
recent findings provided a complementary tool to the historical method. However, the
justification for its use is the same as for the historical method. It provided a foundation
to build upon.
The use of these three research methods allowed for comprehensive investigation
of the research subject. The historical and documentary methods developed a broad
foundation upon which the research could be continued. The case study method
produced insights into the research subject.

2.4 Limitations of the Research
The researcher who uses the historical or documentary method of research must
ensure the genuineness and truthfulness of sources (Lang, 1984). The researcher was
able to verify the accuracy of much of the secondary data by cross checking with other
sources. When secondary data has been cited or quoted in the articles, the information
gathered from articles, books, etc., has been cross checked with the original source. This
evaluation of historical and documentary evidence is termed “historical criticism.”
The concept has been divided into internal and external criticism. External
criticism is concerned with the determination that the source is authentic. Internal
criticism is then defined as determining that the data within the source is accurate (Borg,
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1971). Obviously, the use of respected, well-documented data is essential to freeing
historical research from internal and external criticism problems.
The foremost prevention against the above limitations and criticisms of the
chosen methodologies is to acknowledge their possibility to occur. Knowledge of the
pitfalls can then be used to design and conduct research, which minimizes the possibility
of their occurrence. The following tools were used in this research to avoid the
limitations and criticism cited:
1. Use of complementary research methods concurrently throughout the research
process.
Case analysis, one of the research methods, is used to study of three Turkish
offset applications among all Turkish foreign weapon system procurements.
All three examples are analyzed intensively to see how do offsets fit into these
applications.
2. Broad-based use of respected, well documented primary sources of data.
Primary data were gathered from articles about Turkish acquisition, mostly
published in Defense News, The DISAM Journal, Turkish Daily News, and
some official publications of The Turkish Ministry of Defense (such as Offset
Guidelines-1991 and 2000), and books about offset agreements.
3. Use of different data sources to cross-check the information gathered.
When data has been cited or quoted in the articles, the information gathered
from articles, books, etc., has been cross-checked with the original source.
The fundamental task is to get as close as possible to the truth.
4. Maintenance of a professional, critical perspective to guard against prejudice
or bias in the research.
Lots of sources are searched for to prevent bias over the thesis topic and
nationality feelings are ignored while evaluating the data.
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Such techniques can effectively prevent the limitations and criticisms detailed in
this section, and the researcher feels that the methodology utilized was both appropriate
and effective in providing answers to the research questions.
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3. REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF LITERATURE
3.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter will discuss the general concept of offsets, the background of the
international arms market, and the factors that led to the growth in the use of offsets.
This discussion will include examples of offset agreements in recent years to illustrate
their complex nature. Finally it closes with a discussion of the current U.S. position on
the use of offsets.

3.2 The World Arms Environment
There has been a change in the nature of world arms transfers since World War II.
Immediately following the war, arms trade in the west consisted almost entirely of the
transfer of surplus weapons on a grant (free) basis from the United States to Western
Europe. The United States considered these transfers necessary to help Europe defend
itself against communism as it rebuilt its damaged industries.
By the early 1960s, most western European countries had recovered sufficiently
to begin sharing the costs of their defense. Consequently, sales of United States weapons
replaced the former grant programs. In the early 1970s, Western European countries
were anxious to develop indigenous defense industries. However, high technology
weapons are costly to produce and most countries do not have sufficient demand for the
weapons or sufficient defense budgets to make stand-alone production either efficient or
affordable (Weida, 1986).
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Based on recent North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and General
Accounting Office (GAO) studies, the principal reasons why other nations seek offsets
include the desire to bring jobs, technology, and production experience to their domestic
firms, to create and/or maintain a domestic defense technology and industrial base, and to
reduce dependence on foreign suppliers. In addition to these economic motives, an
important political motivation, consistently articulated by European defense ministry
officials in a recent NATO study, is to “keep the Parliament contented which, in turn,
requires that public opinion be willing to support the expenditure of public funds to buy
weapons and equipment from abroad . . . offsets are presented to show a longer term gain
to the national economy, national defense and the Alliance …” (Petty, 1999).
In 1986, a U.S. interagency group defined offsets as “industrial compensation
practices required as a condition of purchase in either government-to-government or
commercial sales of defense articles and/or defense services as specified in the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations” (Department of Commerce, 1998). Under the
terms of an offset agreement, the seller agrees to formal or informal compensatory
demands made by the purchasing nation.
Offsets are classified as “direct” or “indirect” (Petty, 1999). Direct offsets
involve an agreement for a transaction directly related to the specific weapon system
purchased, such as the seller’s acquisition from the purchasing nation of components for
the system being purchased. Indirect offsets require the seller to purchase goods or
services that are unrelated to the product acquired. Such agreements generally require
that a percentage of the purchase price be spent in the acquiring country’s economy,
usually within a negotiated period of time. Offsets may be structured to co-produce, to
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produce under license, to subcontract, to transfer technology, or to make an overseas
investment. Direct offsets are often accomplished simply through the purchasing nation’s
manufacture of components or subcomponents, or its delivery of services to be
incorporated into the product being sold. However, they can be accomplished through a
licensing and co-production agreement. A current example is the production of the F-16
aircraft in Turkiye by licensee, Turkish Aerospace Industries Inc. (TAI), under a license
from Lockheed Martin. In addition to producing F-16s for the Turkish Air Force, TAI
produced the F-16 for Egypt and is competing to build the fighter for other nations.
An offset “agreement” is the negotiated agreement between the U.S. exporter and
the foreign government (or its state-controlled company) providing that the exporter will
complete a certain amount of offset work (subcontracts, transfers of technology, etc.)
within a given time period (Defense Offsets Commission, 2001).
An offset “transaction” is the actual delivery of the offset work by the U.S.
exporter (e.g., the placement of a specific subcontract, the transfer of a particular
technology) in fulfillment of the exporter’s offset agreement. For its completion of the
transaction, the exporter receives offset “credits” which, in some cases, can be traded
among exporters (Defense Offsets Commission, 2001).
To determine from a military perspective whether offsets are strategically
beneficial or detrimental, we must consider much larger issues, such as weapon
proliferation, technology transfers, inter-operability, military alliances through equipping
and training, and the industrial base and economies of scale. Each of these issues will be
discussed in turn.

19

3.2.1 Proliferation
Arms proliferation is a global concern, especially for weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), mines, small arms, and technically-advanced weapons. Offsets can potentially
accelerate this proliferation through sales, co-production, and technology transfer. In the
past importers of arms accepted generation-old systems, but today, weapon sales have
become a buyer’s market. Buyers friendly to the U.S. can request and receive many topof-the-line systems. Although the U.S. continues to maintain technological superiority in
arms, that advantage can vanish through satisfying other countries’ offset demands for
the most modern systems and technology. Then the cycle continues with a need for U.S.
research and development to once again progress to a militarily dominant position. For
example, Lockheed lobbyists inform Congress that several countries own the very
capable combat F-15 and F-16, thereby justifying the need for the F-22 (Petty, 1999).

3.2.2 Technology Transfer
“Technology transfer is one of the most highly valued offsets”(Hsiung, 1998).
Approximately one-quarter of all defense-offset transactions involve the transfer of
technology (Petty, 1999). It is difficult to control and monitor shared technology or to
monitor where it eventually goes. Refusing to transfer technology through an offset can
jeopardize defense sales. If one company won't provide the technology transfer, another
one will and it will get the sale.
Technology transfers, largely promoted by offsets, can thus pose a threat to
national security and the military. Technical knowledge and advanced or enhanced
weapon systems can end up in the hands of an adversary. Likewise, research and
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development or production knowledge can be used and shared to benefit other nations’
acquisition programs. Alarmingly, the technology that improved Iraqi Scud missiletargeting capabilities was originally transferred from the U.S. to Brazil through an offset
program (Wolf, 1997). Since the U.S. is primarily an exporter of weapon systems and
technology, it does not substantially benefit from offset technology transfers. But the
U.S. can be threatened directly and indirectly through these transfers.

3.2.3 Interoperability
Since widespread use of the same equipment is the most obvious form of
interoperability, offsets can be interpreted to promote equipment and training purchases.
On the high technology battlefield where the U.S. will fight alongside of multinational
forces, there is a greater need for standardization and commonality. Especially critical is
interoperability of command, control, communication, computers, and intelligence (C4I)
technologies. But U.S. allies, such as North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
partners, have often balked at adopting U.S. C4I equipment and standards due to cost,
industrial competitiveness, national sovereignty, and jobs (Petty, 1999). However,
offsets may have broken down many of these barriers and improved interoperability.
With interoperability gained through offsets, more countries own, maintain, and fight
with American equipment, so the U.S. military can potentially benefit from foreignowned manufacture and repair facilities. The U.S. military currently uses foreign
companies at their foreign locations to rebuild and repair weapon systems. Many of these
overseas facilities were established through offset co-production agreements. The
capability of this expanded friendly industrial base will become even more important in
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times of conflict when requirements will out-pace the domestic industrial base’s
capability. The U.S. can then benefit from the redundancy of strategic locations of
critical, interoperable items. For example, the F-16 now can be maintained, repaired, or
even manufactured at locations that literally span the globe. To meet the challenges of
interoperability, offsets can be especially useful in partnering and cooperation that begins
at system development. Cooperative international programs, supported by offsets,
provide seamless interoperability that is essential to strategic success.

3.3 U.S. Government Policy
There are two different perspectives on offsets. The recipient’s view is that
offsets are an integral part of the sale itself rather than unrelated compensation practices.
The supplier’s view is that offsets improve the overall value of the sale. These
conflicting views are useful in understanding how governments establish offset policies.
The increasing use of offsets has motivated a lot of countries (including Turkiye) to set
their own offset policies. Discussing the offset policy of the United States as a general
supplier will help us to understand how the offsets policy of Turkiye, as one of the
recipient countries, is established.
The United States government policy on offsets in military exports was initiated
in 1978 in a memorandum issued by Deputy Secretary of Defense Charles Duncan. The
memorandum indicated that there were inherent difficulties in negotiating and
implementing compensatory co-production and offset agreements. The memorandum
also indicated that the U.S. contractors involved in an offset agreement must bear the
total responsibility for fulfilling its conditions (US DoD, 1978). This policy led to a
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situation where, as a 1984 General Accounting Office (GAO) report stated, “The United
States Government has no comprehensive national policy on offset agreements for the
sale of military equipment to foreign governments" (Department Of Commerce, 1984).
Offset deals are made when foreign countries successfully demand some form of
compensation, a non-monetary rebate if you will, for purchasing armaments. With
international competition to win lucrative arms sales around the globe so fierce, the
returns regularly surpass 100 percent of the value of the equipment purchased (Ruppe,
2001). An offset arrangement can include sharing part of the manufacturing work of the
purchased equipment. It can also involve transfers of American technology, licensed coproduction of American equipment for U.S. troops or for sales to other countries, or other
types of technological or economic benefits provided by the U.S. exporter. The
phenomenon has strategic thinkers concerned that America is bartering away some of its
technological edge. U.S. defense workers are concerned about losing jobs. And small- to
medium-sized defense contractors worry about losing sub-contracting work (Ruppe,
2001).
The current United States policy guide is the “U.S. Government Policy on Offsets
in Military Exports.” This policy is a result of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1989, which required the President to establish a comprehensive defense
trade offset policy.
The policy describes that the U. S. government views certain offsets to be
economically inefficient and market distorting. The policy directs that certain principles
should be followed to minimize the adverse effects of offsets, while not hampering U. S.
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firms’ ability to compete for military export sales. This policy was issued on April 16,
1990, by the White House Press Secretary in the following statement.
The president announced today his policy on offsets in military
exports. This responds to the requirement under FY 1989 National
Defense Authorization Act, Section 8925, and 10 U.S. C. Sec. 2505.
The president stated that the United States Government is
committed to the principles of free and fair trade. Consequently, the
United States Government views certain offsets for military exports as
economically inefficient and market distorting. Mindful of the need to
minimize the adverse effects of offsets in military exports, while ensuring
that the ability of U.S. firms to compete for military exports sales is not
undermined, the President has established the following policy:
No agency of the United States Government shall encourage, enter
directly into, or commit U.S. firms to any offset arrangement in
connection with the sale of defense goods or services to foreign
governments. United States Government funds shall not be used to
finance offsets in security assistance transactions except in accordance
with currently established policies and procedures.
Nothing in this policy shall prevent agencies of The United States
Government from fulfilling obligations incurred through international
agreements entered into prior to the issuance of this policy. The decision
whether to engage in offsets, and the responsibility for the negotiation and
implementing offset arrangements, resides with the companies involved.
Any exceptions to this policy must be approved by the President through
the National Security Council.
The President also noted that the time has come to consult with our
friends and allies regarding the use of offsets in defense procurement. He
has, therefore, directed the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the
Secretary of State, to lead an interagency team to consult with foreign
nations with a view to limiting the adverse effects of offsets on defense
procurement. This interagency team will report periodically on the results
of these consultations and forward any recommendations to the National
Security Council. (The White House Office of Press Secretary, 1990)
The 1992 amendment of the Defense Production Act directed the Department of
Commerce to lead in assessing the impact of offsets. The President’s 1996 National
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Export Strategy recommended consultation with foreign nations to limit the adverse
effects of offsets. The recommendation ended with what a DoD official described as the
DoD position: “The United States should be cautious and not make any decisions to
unilaterally limit offsets” (Trade Promotion Coordinating Committee, 1996). Some
academic analysts have described the U. S. official policy on offsets as “ambivalent,”
saying they are a product of “benign, albeit somewhat confused, neglect” (Udis, 1996).
The United States government normally does not regulate offsets negotiated by industry;
however, there have been some exceptions. In the 1990 competition between McDonnell
Douglas and General Dynamics counterbids escalated for a $5.2 billion fighter sale to
South Korea. Even early bids included an offset licensing of technology for producing
the aircraft. But the government imposed a 30 percent cap on the value of additional
offsets.
U.S. arms sales policy explicitly controls the transfer of arms. The sale of
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons is prohibited; however, most conventional
weapons can be sold, with the exception of ballistic/cruise missiles, anti-personnel
landmines, Stinger missiles, napalm, and depleted uranium anti-tank ammunition. Sales
are approved on a case-by-case basis, subject to an interagency review and review of the
policy for the country or region under consideration (Federation of American Scientists,
2001)
On the one hand, offsets may strengthen U.S. national security by increasing the
capabilities of defense firms in allied nations, thereby strengthening U.S. joint defense
capabilities. This facilitates exports of U.S. defense systems, thereby helping to maintain
the economic viability of U.S. defense firms and the defense systems they develop. On
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the other hand, offsets may harm U.S. national security by increasing the capabilities of
foreign defense firms, which in turn may increase the proliferation of weapons and
technology to nations hostile to the United States. This may deprive capable U.S.
defense firms and their workers of business in favor of foreign firms, thereby eroding the
U.S. supplier base and allowing the skills of essential U.S. defense workers to atrophy.
This would increase U.S. dependence on foreign suppliers.
Existing U.S. government policy on offsets is used to persuade other countries to
reduce their offset demands or shift the types of offsets they request toward more benign
activities. The U.S. government seeks a multilateral agreement with its trading partners
to reduce or prohibit the use of offsets in defense trade, work cooperatively with other
countries to shift their offset demands away from defense production which supplants
U.S. work and jobs, and toward activities that could serve their economic and political
needs. The objective is to seek benign or even positive effects for the United States, and
increase foreign firms’ involvement in the research and development stages of new
defense systems. This is in order to reduce their government's subsequent demand for
offsets (Defense Offsets Commission, 2001).

3.4 Summary
Offsets are classified as “direct” or “indirect” (Petty, 1999). Direct offsets
involve an agreement for a transaction directly related to the specific weapon system
purchased, such as the seller’s acquisition from the purchasing nation of components for
the system being purchased. Indirect offsets require the seller to purchase goods or
services that are unrelated to the product acquired. Such agreements generally require
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that a percentage of the purchase price be spent in the acquiring country’s economy,
usually within a negotiated period of time. Offsets may be structured to co-produce, to
produce under license, to subcontract, to transfer technology, or to make an overseas
investment. Offsets have become a well-established part of international arms trade.
They will remain so well into the future.
The current United States policy guide (The Presidential 1990 offset policy)
limited agency involvement in offset arrangements, which limits the DoD’s ability to
substantially impact offset policy. Nonetheless, the complex issues surrounding offsets
certainly concern the DoD. From a military perspective, not all offsets are bad.
Properly controlled, they can promote national security. Offsets positively impact
interoperability, alliances, training, and modernization; they have a substantial positive
impact on the industrial base and economies of scale. Notwithstanding, offsets promote
proliferation of weapon systems that may negatively or positively influence national
security. Finally, the impact of technology transfer is generally negative.
Even though foreign business competitors often receive offset assistance from
their governments, the DoD should continue its policy not to recognize or accept
responsibility to implement offsets. However, the DoD should resist the tendency to
focus internally and remain open to international development and cooperative
acquisitions. Failure to work with industry and other countries in an environment that is
increasingly global could threaten advancements in interoperability, preservation and
expansion of the industrial base, and strength of alliances.
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4. DEFENSE OFFSETS OF REPUBLIC OF TURKIYE
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a comprehensive case study of the Defense offsets of the
Republic of Turkiye. It will begin with general information on the geographical and
political history of Turkiye and then describe the relations with the United States of
America. The development of Turkish offset policy will be presented. The discussion
will include basic Turkish policies for offsets. The final section will include descriptions
of some Turkish offset agreements.

4.2 General Information about Turkiye
Turkiye is located at a place where the three continents making up the old world
(Asia, Africa and Europe) are closest to each other. Turkiye is actually at the point
where Europe and Asia meet.
Geographically, Turkiye is a large, roughly rectangular peninsula situated bridgelike between southeastern Europe and Asia. Indeed, the country has functioned as a
bridge for human movement throughout history. Turkiye extends more than 1,600
kilometers from west to east but generally less than 600 kilometers from north to south.
Total land area is about 814,578 square kilometers, of which 790,200 square kilometers
are in Asia and 24,378 square kilometers in Europe. The country is located in the
northern half of the hemisphere at a place that is about halfway between the equator and
the north pole, a latitude of 36 degrees N to 42 degrees N and a longitude of 26 degrees E
to 45 degrees E (See Figure 1).
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There are two European and six Asian neighboring countries surrounding the land
of Turkiye as neighbor. The land border to the northeast with the Commonwealth of
Independent States is 610 kilometers long. The border with Iran is 454 kilometers long,
and the border with Iraq is 331 kilometers long. In the south the border with Syria is 877
kilometers long. Turkiye 's borders on the European continent consist of a 212-kilometer
frontier with Greece and a 269-kilometer border with Bulgaria.

Figure 1. Map of Turkiye
Because of its geographical location, the mainland of Anatolia (Turkiye) is a
bridge connecting the Middle East and Europe, and it shares in the history of both those
parts of the world. Despite the diversity of its peoples and their cultures, and the
constantly shifting borders of its ethnic map, Anatolia has a history characterized by
remarkable continuity. It is the birthplace of many great civilizations. It has also been
known as a center of commerce because of its land connections to three continents and
the seas surrounding it on three sides (Embassy of the Republic of Turkiye, 2001a).
With a population of 65 millions, Turkey is one of the largest markets in the
Middle East and Western Europe. The U.S. Department of Commerce says Turkiye is
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among the “10 big emerging markets,” and one of the “20 most dynamic countries in the
World Trade Organization.” Turkiye is at the center of a new economic and political area
known as “Eurasia,” a place where Europe, the former Soviet Union and the Middle East
meet. Turkiye is expected to become a member of the European Union by 2005 (The
Washington Times, 2000).

4.2.1 Turkish Politics and Policy
The government of Turkiye functions in accordance with the constitution of 1982.
The Republic of Turkiye is a democratic, secular state governed by the rule of law
respecting human rights and loyal to the political philosophy of Kemal Atatürk, who was
the Republic’s founding father. The Turkish State, with its territory and nation, is an
indivisible entity.
Turkiye is fully committed to democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, the rule of law, and a free market economy. Closer integration
into the international community, in particular into Western institutions, has always been
a priority of Turkish foreign policy.
Education is based on contemporary science and education methods and is
provided under the supervision and control of the state. The official language of the
Turkish State is Turkish and its capital is Ankara. Everyone possesses inherent
fundamental rights and freedoms. The individual is entitled to privacy and to freedom of
thought and communication
The fundamental goals and duties of the State are to safeguard the independence and
the integrity of the Turkish Nation (Embassy of the Republic of Turkiye, 2001b).
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4.2.2 Relations with the United States of America
Turkish-American friendship dates back to early 19th century. Although there was a
trade agreement, dated 1830, between the Ottoman Empire and the United States (U.S.
Department of State, 1984), relations in the 19th century and even in the early 20th
century remained largely confined to the activities of American missionaries in the
Ottoman Empire as well as to limited trade largely in tobacco and currant. Even with the
onset of the First World War, the Balkans and the Middle East, including the Ottoman
Empire, were not considered as traditional areas of American national interest.
There was a ten-year break in diplomatic relations between the two countries from
1917 to 1927. During this period, one note of interest was the refusal of the U.S. Senate
to ratify a bilateral Treaty of Amity and Commerce concluded in Lausanne in August of
1923 between the new Turkish Republic and the United States. Once diplomatic
relations were resumed in 1927, however, the relationship took a relatively better turn
(Republic of Turkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002). Nevertheless, the interaction
between the two countries remained minimal at the time.
After World War II, Turkiye 's foremost ally has been the United States. Because
of Turkiye's strategic location in the Middle East, its proximity to the Former Soviet
Union's military installations and test sites, and its control of the Black Sea straits,
military ties with the United States were a crucial factor in the East-West confrontation.
The alliance originated soon after the end of World War II. The Truman Doctrine of
March 12, 1947 was the beginning of a new era in Turkish-American relations. Close
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working relations were established between Turkiye and the U.S. in the political,
military, economic, technical, social and cultural affairs during this period (Republic of
Turkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002).
Turkiye has gained strong allies and protection against the U.S.S.R. Turkiye is
providing the control of the Dardanelle and the Bosphorus, and it is the first line defense
for NATO’s southern flank. It is also a strategic communication and transportation link
between Arab oil sources and the West.
Turkiye had joined the United Nations (UN) on August 15, 1945 (Nyrop, 1973).
On June 27, 1950, the United Nations' Security Council invited the organization’s
members to repel the armed attack against the Republic of Korea, which was aided and
abetted by the Soviet Union. In response to this request, the Turkish government sent a
mixed brigade of 4,500 men to the conflict. This unit was the third largest to participate
in this action, after the American and South Korean forces. As a result of their
distinguished actions, the Turks were highly praised by the other forces (Vali, 1971).
In September 1951, both the U.S. and Britain proposed full NATO membership
for Turkiye and Greece. This proposal was accepted by the organization and on February
18, 1952, Turkiye and Greece became full members of NATO (Harris, 1972). In
accordance with bilateral defense arrangements under NATO authority, the United States
has developed and maintained several major military installations on Turkish bases
(Republic of Turkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002).
Cordial relations between the U.S. and Turkiye continued until 1974. The
relationship between the U.S. and Turkiye continued well except for an arms embargo of
Turkiye. The embargo was in response to Turkish military action (Peace Operation) in
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Cyprus and was lifted in 1977. By the time the embargo ended, the Turkish armed forces
had been severely weakened. General Alexander Haig, the Commander of NATO,
indicated in July 1978 that less than half of Turkiye’s aircraft were operational (Byrd,
1978).
During the years of the embargo, Turkiye considered different sources for
obtaining military equipment and spares. One source considered was domestic
production. Other important sources were other NATO nations (especially Germany) and
some Arab nations. It can be said that the embargo encouraged Turks to seek better
relations with her neighbors, but Turkiye never accepted military aid from the U.S.S.R.
and the other Warsaw Pact nations. However, whatever problems were encountered
during this period, they never jeopardized the strong underlying partnership between the
U.S. and Turkiye. A new chapter in Turkish-American relations opened in the 1980s.
Greater cooperation and U.S. support for Turkiye increased significantly (Republic of
Turkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2002).
In 1991 Turkiye and the U.S. agreed to upgrade their cooperation even further and
give it the status of an enhanced partnership (Republic of Turkiye Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, 2002). Since then bilateral relations have continued to prosper in many fields.
Post-Cold War developments have clearly shown that more than ever Turkiye and the
U.S. currently share a set of common strategic, security, and economic concerns and
interests which naturally bring them closer together.
Over the years, Turkiye has been one of the greatest recipients of U.S. grants and
monies from various U.S. programs (Nuber, 1995). These include the Economic Support
Fund (ESF), Military Assistance Program (MAP), Foreign Military Financing Program
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(FMFP), and International Military Education and Training (IMET) program. In
addition, Turkiye has been a valued user of the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) process.
Back in FY 1985, Turkiye received $700 million in FMS credits and MAP grants. For
FY95, Turkiye was allocated $365 million in commercial rate loans; the era of credits
and grants has come to an end. Turkiye’s IMET allocation, which had been around $3
million for several years, is now at $1 million (Nuber, 1995).
Turkish defense exports to the United States traditionally have been negligible.
They include small volumes of aircraft parts made by Turkiye’s Akinci-based Tusas
Aerospace Industries Inc. (TAI) under offset arrangements related to Turkiye’s F-16
fighter purchases. There are some new efforts to enter the U.S. market. FNSS Defense
Systems Inc., an Ankara-based Turkish-U.S. joint venture between United Defense L.P.,
Arlington, Virginia, and Nurol Holding, Ankara, is competing to provide the U.S. Army
with a new mid-weight armored vehicle design. It is the first major opportunity for the
Turkish defense industry to participate in a major U.S. program. It could be a large
export opportunity for Turkiye and it could show that the Turkish armored vehicle
industry is competitive not only in other parts of the world, but also in the United States
(Enginsoy, 2000).

4.3 Turkish Offset Policy
All governments purchase defense equipment, and it is hardly surprising that over
130 countries have some form of offset policy (Martin, 1996). As defense budgets are
cut and competition in the industry increases, offsets are likely to become more rather
than less important. Firms are seeking to compete for contracts by offering increasingly
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attractive offset packages and purchasers are increasingly demanding domestic benefits
for their defense expenditures.
With regard to giving and receiving offset work, countries can be categorized into
three groups. First, there are countries like the USA that largely export equipment, and
thus give offsets. The USA has a policy not to accept offsets. However, major foreign
procurements demand offsets. The USA purchased major weapon systems such as the
Harrier aircraft, the Ptarmigan radio system, or Beretta pistol with 100% production
offset, all purchasing agreements stipulated that final assembly takes place in America
(Petty, 1999). Second, there are a small number of countries such as the UK, Germany,
France, and Israel, that both import and export armaments, and thus both give and receive
offset work. Finally, there is the large number of states that largely import defense
equipment, and who typically only receive offset work. Turkiye is one of the countries
that fall into this category.
Turkiye has been seeking to modernize her defense forces and has attempted to
use offsets to improve her defense industrial base. Today, 80 percent of the world’s
crises have taken place within close proximity to Turkiye: the Balkans, Israel, Lebanon,
Iran, Iraq, Syria and the Caucasus region (Book, 2002). Due to its location at the center of
a region historically characterized by instability, Turkiye continues to be obligated to
commit substantial amounts of limited resources for defense and defense industry as a
matter of self-protection and survival. Constituting, sustaining, and maintaining deterrent
armed forces both at a high state of readiness and with the necessary and proper
equipment is extremely costly and can have quite a negative effect on the economy,
especially when limited defense dollars are spent off-shore (Egeli, 1999). Therefore,
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under military procurement programs, the efficient use of Turkiye’s limited resources has
become imperative. Emphasis has been and continues to be placed on developing and/or
enhancing indigenous capabilities within various sectors comprising the defense industry
infrastructure. From this point of view, the provision of direct and indirect offset
activities become extremely important in first, establishing and/or sustaining an
indigenous defense industry infrastructure capable of satisfying Defense’s needs; and
secondly, at the same time, fostering domestic economic growth during future military
procurement programs by minimizing off-shore expenditures (Egeli, 1999).
One important step the Turkish government has taken to meet the requirements of
the 21st Century is the creation of the Undersecretariat of Defense Industries, or Savunma
Sanayi Müsteşarlığı (SSM, to use the Turkish acronym) in 1985. This organization
comes under the Ministry of National Defense (MND) and is tasked with building a
military-industrial complex and in entering into defense cooperation arrangements and
large-scale procurement programs, like the F-16 co-production program. It is the initial
point of entry for foreign defense contractors desiring to do business with Turkiye. SSM
commands an annual budget of one billion dollars Defense Industry Support Fund –
supported by levies on gas, tobacco, alcohol, and gambling – to finance its programs
(Bekdil, 2000b). SSM is the only government agency in Turkiye equipped with power to
administer military offsets. The Foreign Trade Undersecretariat, on the other hand, is
responsible for offset programs in nonmilitary procurements. For example, procurement
of a commercial plane for Turkish Airlines can carry out by The Foreign Trade
Undersecretariat. Sometimes, it is possible to see some defense related offset programs
which are carried out by The Foreign Trade Undersecretariat.
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In 1984, Turkiye had its first offset experience with the F-16 fighter program,
which was conducted by General Dynamics. The program was implemented and
monitored under the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense. The
Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade actively took part in the export of
commercial and industrial goods under the program. Since then, under the various
procurement programs, SSM has signed twenty-nine offset agreements with twenty-one
companies (Egeli, 1999). During this time, Turkish offset policy has changed markedly
from one purchase to another. Like many offset authorities around the globe, Turkiye is
presently developing and evaluating an updated/revised set of offset guidelines. The
intent of these updated/revised guidelines is to encourage additional business transactions
that will further contribute toward the achievement of SSM’s offset policy objectives. On
12 May 2000 the new directive which explains principles of offset implementations in the
Turkish Defense Industry procurements was submitted. The core objective of the
changes was to increase the work share of local companies and, in the long term, improve
their competitiveness in foreign markets (Sariibrahimoglu, 2000). Basically, the new
offset directive gives more flexible legislation for direct offsets which do not perform
well under the previous strict guidelines. After issuing the original 1991 guidelines, SSM
encountered difficulties, mainly in direct offsets, with many countries failing to fulfill
their commitments. This was largely because the programs were directly related to
defense-related exports and the joint venture companies faced difficulties exporting into
Turkiye's relatively new defense market. These problems were worsened by worldwide
shrinking defense industry markets. To overcome this problem with the new directive,
the definition of direct offsets has been expanded to include exports directly or indirectly
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related to commercial products. For example, under a military helicopter/aircraft
program, export of the commercial equivalent can be qualified as a direct offset.
The reason for the new offset approach is the belief that both foreign contractors
and Turkish companies will be better able to mutually develop meaningful offset projects
resulting in long-term partnerships. A revision of current Turkish offset guidelines can
give more flexibility to foreign contractors in fulfilling their offset obligations. With this
revision, SSM aims to define a clear-cut set of priorities, which underlie its promotion of
offsets. Optimally, SSM seeks a transfer of technology, whether through direct
investment, co-production, licensing or know-how arrangements. In the area of
purchases of Turkish goods, preferences are being given to the defense and technology
oriented sectors. For future defense deals, when other conditions are equivalent, Turkiye
will opt for countries that are providing higher technology transfer. Technology transfer
and approval of export licenses – together with Turkiye’s right to export defense
equipment to third countries – became crucial factors in determining the country’s future
defense contracts (Sariibrahimoglu, 2000).
However, as a major export country, the U.S. administration has pledged to
examine Turkiye’s requests for export license and technology transfer on a case-by-case
basis, rather than making general commitments. At one extreme (low transfer), all
critical equipment was produced in the United States and added to planes in F-16 fighter
co-production in Turkiye. However, opportunities exist for increased levels of
technology transfer and cooperation. For example, the co-production of 145 attack
helicopters worth $4 billion and 1,000 main battle tanks, worth $7 billion in Turkiye
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(both projects will be examined in further section) could be an opportunity for Turkiye to
secure partial access to U.S. technology (Bekdil, 2000c).
Research and development studies have been carried out with some projects.
Values of these studies are different in every projects. Research and development studies
have big importance in defense industry, but in some offsets aggrements, level of studies
is not high enough. Initialy, joint ventures, transfer of technology through licensing
agreemnts, the transfer of turnkey factories and assembly units had created very limited
backward and forward linkages between studies (Akin, 2002). But some joint venture
companies are paying more attention for research and development studies. For example,
FNSS Savunma Sistemleri A.Ş. is an American-Turkish joint venture company
established by United Defense L.P. of USA and NUROL Holding of Turkiye. A contract
made between FNSS and the Turkish Government to produce 1698 armored fighting
vehicles (AFVs), advanced armored personnel carriers (AAPCs), armored TOW vehicles
(ATVs) and armored mortar vehicles (AMVs) became effective on 15 August 1989.
Besides vehicle production, establishment of a fully equipped research and development
unit for development in Turkiye was aimed to attain as one of the objectives in the project
(FNSS, 2002).
As a result of a search for a new exclusive defense equipment supplier and
partner, Turkiye and Israel, in February 1996, signed two unprecedented agreements on
military and defense industry cooperation as the basis for a new strategic alliance. In the
military cooperation agreement, Turkish and Israeli fighter pilots have trained in each
other’s territory and the partner’s navies have held joint exercises in the Mediterranean
Sea. The Turkish government and Israeli Aerospace Industries Ltd. (IAI) signed the
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defense industry agreement. It was the first large scale defense industry deal between the
two countries. It covered the upgrade of 54 Turkish F-4E fighters for $630 million and
an $85 million deal in 1998 to modernize 48 Turkish F-5A/B jets. Both were sole-source
deals (Bekdil, 2000d).
SSM’s policy objectives are anticipated at this time to remain the same even when
the new guidelines are released. SSM’s offset policy objectives are (Egeli, 1999):
1. To increase foreign currency inflows either by exporting defense industry
products and other related industrial Turkish products or by foreign capital
investments in order to compensate for the foreign currency outflows
incurred for the financing of defense industry projects.
2. To save foreign currency by transferring technology and creating both new
production capabilities and increasing existing production.
3. To ensure established industries’ self-sufficiency and to enable projects to be
implemented in a productive way by creating new business opportunities and
Turkish Value Added. Turkish Value Added incentive is a way of increase
the local content of exported products (it will be discussed in greater detail in
a later section).
4. To improve quality, standardization and productivity of the existing
industries and also industries to be established through technology transfer
and export sales, and in this way to increase international competitiveness of
the Turkish economy as a whole.
The new guidelines introduce changes to the direct portion of the Turkish military
offset program guidelines and seek to achieve the benefits and advantages of offsets. The
changes intend to encourage prospective contractors to consider mutually beneficial
business opportunities, while at the same time, making it easier for Turkish companies to
secure work associated with defense programs. It has been argued that, “The new
guidelines are a result of pressure from foreign firms” (Bekdil, 2000e). However, the
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revisions apparently have been devised to comfort the contractor, rather than to maximize
offsets gains. In that way, they look concessionary.
Direct Offset
Direct Offsets are contractual arrangements that involve defense articles and
services referenced in the sales agreement for military exports. Under the evolving new
guidelines, the definition of direct offsets are expanded to also include (Egeli, 1999):
1. Export of defense goods and/or services by a Turkish business to the
country of the eligible party or third countries.
2. Previously the exports needed to be directly or indirectly related to the
project. Under the new guidelines and subject to SSM’s approval,
these exports may also be directly or indirectly related to commercial
projects. For example, under a military helicopter/aircraft program,
export of the commercial equivalent can be qualified as a direct offset.
3. License, know-how, and technology transfers relating to the prime
contract, using the multipliers quoted for technology transfers realized
under the contractors’ indirect offset obligations,
4. The Turkish value added of goods and services procured from Turkish
subcontractors in Turkiye relating to the prime contract/project,
5. Depot level maintenance projects relating to the prime contract
(tooling, equipment, drawings, engineering information, training,
assistance, etc.).
Subject to final guideline decisions, contractors may be required to fulfill 50% of
their direct offset obligation through the export of defense products directly or indirectly
related to the Prime Contract/Project (Egeli, 1999).
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Indirect Offsets
Indirect Offsets are contractual arrangements that involve goods and services
unrelated to the exports referenced in the sales agreement. Under the evolving new
guidelines, the definition of indirect offsets is defined as (Egeli, 1999):
1. New or expanded foreign investment.
2. License, know-how, and technology transfer; training opportunities in
Turkiye and abroad.
3. Research and developments financed by the contractor for Turkish
universities and other research institutions.
4. Investment by the contractor in industrial companies to establish and
operate research and development facilities.
5. Exports of Turkish defense or related industry products and services.
Offset Credits
Offset credits are being granted on the basis of Turkish value added; however, if
Turkish value added exceeds 50% of product price then the product price is used as
Turkish value added for offsets credit purposes. Subject to SSM approval, for high-tech
defense products, this Turkish value added threshold could be set as low as 30%.
The SSM performed a survey of Turkish industry production capabilities prior to
establishing these new percentage thresholds and believes the new calculation
methodology allows for an implicit multiplying effect in the 2 - 3.3 range (Egeli, 1999).

Turkish Added Value Incentive
A new Turkish added value concept regarding the export type of offsets provide
another incentive for contractors. In order to encourage contractors to increase the local
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content of exported products, this incentive mechanism may be enhanced. For example,
assume a contractor will export a high-tech defense product with a minimum Turkish
value added of 40% (this percentage has to be approved by SSM prior to any export). In
this case, if the Turkish value added exceeds 40% of the exported product invoice price,
the contractor will get full offset credit on the total invoice amount in accordance with the
new offset policy. If, however, the Turkish value added is less than 40%, the contractor
only gets offset credit for that amount. It is imperative that the Turkish added value
incentive mechanism be attractive enough to encourage eligible parties to actively work
to increase the local content of the exported product. As such, SSM is considering a new
crediting mechanism. If the local content of an exported product is increased some
substantial amount, a multiplier will be used on the total invoice amount. For example, if
the total content were to increase from 40% to 50% Turkish value added, this would
represent an increase of 1.5 times and a multiplier of 1.5 would be applied to the total
invoice amount. This policy would further encourage contractor to significantly increase
local content.
According to the current export regime, Turkish suppliers who export goods and
services have the right to obtain export incentive from the Undersecretariat of Foreign
Trade. Turkish suppliers are allowed to temporarily import raw materials; parts and
components for export purposes without paying custom taxes, duties, and levies.
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Penalty
If the offset commitments are not met at the time and in the manner required, then
(Egeli, 1999):
1. Penalties at the rate of 10% shall be applied to the unfulfilled and escalated
offset amount. Enforcement of penalties does not relieve the contractor of
liability for losses resulting from its failure to meet its contractual offset
commitment.
2. Any contractor who fails to meet the offset commitment may not be allowed
to participate in SSM’s projects for a specific period of time to be determined
by SSM.
In order to secure the penalty payments, Contractor is required to submit a letter
of bank guarantee that is equal to the potential offset penalties to be assessed under its
total offset commitment as an effectivity condition of the offset agreement.

Multiplier
Multipliers between one and five are used for investments, technology transfers,
know-how to be realized in different fields, and for training to be provided free of charge.
SSM is authorized to apply these multipliers by considering the level and quality of
investment, technology transfer, know-how and training (Egeli, 1999).

Bank Guarantee
A bank guarantee in the form of an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) obtained
from a reputable and trusted bank in the amount, which is equal to the potential total
penalty value of the offset commitment, is required (Egeli, 1999).
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Project Evaluation Bases and Criterion
Activities related to the projects executed by the Undersecretariat for Defense
Industry by the decision of Executive Committee are executed as described below.
After decision for execution of the project by Undersecretariat for Defense
Industry, the project management organization is constituted.

Usually, project

management organization consists of Executive Committee, High Level Committee,
Project Coordination Group and Project Office. The highest level decision organ is
Executive Committee, which consists of Primer Minister, Head of Turkish General Staff,
and Minister of National Defense; High Level Committee consists of Undersecretary for
Defense Industries, representatives of Turkish General Staff and related forces; Project
Coordination Group consists of project general coordinator, project technical coordinator,
project economic coordinator, representatives of Turkish General Staff and related forces.
Project Office consists of Undersecretariat for Defense Industry personnel and
representatives of related forces. If necessary, representatives of Turkish Aerospace
Industry, Defense Technology Engineering Inc. (STM) and related industry could be
added to the Project Office (SSM, 2002a).
The project is executed by the Project Coordinator who is assigned by
Undersecretariat for Defense Industry. Request for proposal (RFP) is prepared by the
project office and after agreement of opinion related committees and user, the RFP is
issued. Also, the project office prepares the project detail schedule and the project is
executed according to schedule. Each project office, also, consists of a Turkish Armed
Forces coordinator or related forces coordinator according the property of project.
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At the evaluation of the project, administrative, economic, technology transfer
and local content, system performance and offset subjects are handled as main criterion.
The project office is divided to subgroups with parallel to main criterion focused above.
Main criterion and weights and sub criterion and weights are fixed before receiving of
proposal, coordinated with user and these are filed as an evaluation guide and evaluation
guide are signed before evaluation process.
All evaluation activities are executed in the Undersecretariat for Defense Industry.
Evaluation committees are collected when pure majority occurred. Each member of
execution committee has one vote. If the members give different scores to the same
criteria, average of the scores are used; if the members give vote like accept or reject to a
criteria, majority of vote is used. Evaluation activities and decisions is written and signed
by the evaluation committee members.
Proposals, evaluation ground rules, evaluation criterion and weights and all
documents related with evaluation activities are classified as secret and carry out of any
documents, notes, sketches related with evaluation activities are prohibited.
After finishing of evaluation, the results are firstly discussed at Project
Coordination Group; secondly discussed at High Level Committee and then the result are
prepared for the presentation to Executive Committee. Then, Executive Committee takes
information about project and gives directives to be base of execution the project (SSM,
2002a).
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The Future of Offset Programs
The SSM has the most extensive experience of all Turkish governmental
institutions with administering offset programs. SSM is the only government
organization in Turkiye responsible for military offsets under the Law No. 3238. The
SSM signed 41 offset agreements between 1989 and Jul. 31, 2001, mainly with joint
venture companies (Sariibrahimoglu, 2001). The potential offset or industrial
cooperation projects under the major defense procurement programs that will be
conducted by SSM are as follows (Jane’s Defense Weekly, 30 August 2000):
•

145 attack helicopters, worth US $4 billion

•

1,000 main battle tanks, worth US $5-7 billion

•

4 airborne early warning and control aircraft, worth US $1-1.5 billion

•

6 mine hunting vessels, worth US $0.75 billion

•

13 UAV systems, worth US $0.25 billion

•

48 police helicopters, worth US $0.3 billion

•

40,000 tactical wheeled vehicles, worth US $3 billion

Turkiye will be allocating roughly US $150 billion on the modernization of its
armed forces during the next 25 years (Egeli, 1999). In order to minimize the negative
impact of this substantial defense expenditure on Turkiye’s national economy, the SSM
will be obligated to take measures that achieve great efficiencies. This will result in high
importance for offset programs. In this regard, directing defense equipment purchases
towards indigenous defense industry to the maximum extent possible, as well as
introducing new technologies with export opportunities, will be key factors in evaluating
future offset proposals. The best-offset projects create an economic win-win for all
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involved parties, the obligor, Turkish industry, and Turkish armed forces. When this
happens, Turkiye’s national economy also wins.

4.4 Turkish Offset Applications
In the early 1980s, as a critical North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and
U.S. ally, with borders on Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Russia, Turkiye began to upgrade its
military substantially and to request offsets more frequently to help compensate for its
increased spending.
In 1984, Turkiye had its first offset experience with the F-16 fighter program,
which was conducted by General Dynamics. The program was implemented and
monitored under the responsibility of the Ministry of National Defense. The
Undersecretariat of Treasury and Foreign Trade took active part in the export of
commercial and industrial goods under the program. Since then, under the various
procurement programs, the SSM has signed twenty-nine offset agreements with twentyone companies.
Three out of twenty-nine offset programs have been successfully completed so
far. As of 31 December 1998, the total offset commitments made by contractors
amounted to US $1.54 billion. This is composed of US $0.39 billion for direct offsets and
US $1.15 billion for indirect offsets. 38.4% of SSM’s US $0.39 billion in direct offsets
have been fulfilled as of year-end; but it is important to acknowledge that the fulfillment
period for many of these direct offset programs continues for quite some time. Also
92.3% of SSM’s US $1.15 billion in indirect offsets were fulfilled as of year-end (Egeli,
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1999). As could be expected, the SSM is most willing to assist contractors that
experience difficulty in discharging their offset obligations.
The next section provides a summary of co-production and offset deals with
Turkiye. Examples of successful offset programs to date are Peace Onyx II F-16 Engine,
Light Transport Aircraft Engine (LTAE), AH-1W Super Cobra Helicopter Lot I and Lot
II. Under Peace Onyx II and LTAE offset programs, Tusas Engine Industry (TEI), a joint
venture between the Turkish Air Force and the aircraft engines division of General
Electric, became the sole source supplier for more than 200 parts with the help of General
Electric (GE). This is a good example of industrial cooperation. This cooperation helped
TEI be competitive in terms of price and quality, while at the same time GE acquired
46% of TEI’s stocks as a partner. GE, in fulfilling its offset commitments, created a winwin situation for both parties. In addition to part manufacturing, TEI benefited from
depot level maintenance capability establishment for miscellaneous engines and received
training in critical defense fields. The TEI partnership was originally formed to produce
aircraft engines for the F-16 “Fighting Falcon.” Since then, the company has begun
producing engines for a variety of aircraft and helicopters. Today, TEI is the 36th largest
exporting company in Turkiye, and is a good example of a working partnership (The
Washington Times, 2000).

4.4.1 Co-production and Offset Deals with Turkiye
240 F-16 Fighters (JDW, 1998):
This is Turkiye's first and largest co-production program that was started in 1984
and marked the development of a significant industrial infrastructure. Under the Peace
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Onyx I program TAI co-produced 152 of 160 Lockheed Martin F-16s that were delivered
to the air force between 1987 and 1995. Peace Onyx II began in mid-1996 with 48 of the
80 F-16s ordered already delivered. Production of the 240 F-16s is due to end next year.
80 of the planes are being financed by a $2.5 billion fund set up by the U.S., Saudi
Arabia, and Kuwait in return for Turkiye's cooperation in the Gulf War. Lockheed
Martin owns 49% of TAI.
F-110-GE-100 Engine F-16 Fighters (DISAM, Spring 1995):
TEI was established in 1985 to manufacture engine components and assemble the
F110-GE-100 engine for the TAI F-16 production line. TEI is a Turkish-American joint
stock company.
ALQ-178 V5 Radar Warning and Electronic Countermeasures for use on F-16
Fighter Planes (JDW, 98):
Microwave Electronic Systems, Inc. (MIKES) produced the ALQ-178 V3 for the
first batch of 160 co-produced F-16s, which was worth $325 million. Lockheed Martin
owns 49% of MIKES.
Light Transport Aircraft Project (SSM, 2002):
In order to meet Turkey's current military and future civilian needs, a contract was
signed with CASA (Construcciones Aeronauticas SA) of Spain in 1990 for the joint
production of 52 CN-235 transport aircraft. Deliveries from TAI's Ankara/Akıncı
facilities have been completed in 1998.
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Basic Training Aircraft (SSM, 2002):
40 SF-260 model aircraft have been jointly manufactured with Italian Agusta at
TAI facilities and delivered to the Turkish Air Forces.
Cougar Helicopters (SSM, 2002):
30 Cougar helicopters were intended to be co-produced in Turkey. For this
purpose, in February 1997 a contract was signed with EUROTAI Consortium, constituted
by EUROCOPTER and TAI. December 11, 2001, total of 15 helicopters has been
delivered to Turkish Armed Forces. Two of them were produced in EC facilities
(France). Remaining 13 helicopters were co-produced in TAI facilities. Out of these
helicopters, 6 are Combat -SAR; 3 are SAR and 6 are Utility.
1,698 Armored Combat Vehicles (ACV) (JDW 8/19/98 and 9/15/99):
The U.S. company FMC entered into a joint venture with Turkish Nurol Savunma
Sanayi to form the company FNSS. Nurol SS has been assembling the first part of the
order under license. The plan calls for 1,698 vehicles of various configurations based on
a FMC design, worth an estimated $1.3 billion, to be produced over an eight-year period
in four variations (infantry fighting vehicle, armored personnel carrier, mortar vehicle,
and TOW vehicle). As of August 1998 the TLFC had received 1,500 vehicles with the
complete delivery expected by the end of 1999. In September 1999, Prime Minister
Bulent Ecevit approved the acquisition of an additional 655 armored infantry fighting
vehicles from FNSS (valued at $450 million).
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Components and Parts for the 1,698 ACV’s (DISAM, 1995):
Texas Instruments has a contract through Aselsan to produce optical sights. The
U.S. companies Alison Transmission, Detroit Diesel, and Cadillac Gage are also
supplying part.
Upgrading M-113s and Producing Components for the F-16 (DISAM, 1995):
Sergeant Fletcher (US), Kayseri Werkplaats (Turkiye), SIAI-Agusta (Italy) and
MBB (Germany) are engaged in joint ventures.
Euro-Stinger Project (DISAM, 1995):
This is a joint venture between Turkiye, Germany, Greece, and the Netherlands to
develop a European version of the U.S. Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missile
licensed by the U.S. company Raytheon. Turkiye is producing around 4,800 missiles.
Assembly of the final product is taking place at both the German plant Dornier and the
Turkish plant Roketsan AS. Roketsan was formed in 1988 and produces rocket motors
and propellants for the Raytheon Stinger missile.

4.4.2 The F-16 Offset Agreement
In 1985, the major concern of the Air Force Directorate (AFD) was the start-up of
the Turkish Air Force Command (TAFC) F-16 co-production/co-assembly program.
Today it is the most important program in the Turkish armed forces quest for
modernization and it has proven to be most beneficial to build Turkiye’s military-
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industrial complex (Hickok, 2000). Turkiye has long recognized the importance of air
power, having founded a separate air force in 1911 (thirty-six years before the United
States). The decision to focus on modernizing the Turkish Air Force was therefore not
surprising, but the choice to pursue co-production of the F-16, instead of buying off-theshelf airframes, marked a crucial turn in Turkiye’s indigenous defense industry and in the
country’s pursuit of military self-sufficiency (Hickok, 2000).
Peace Onyx I
The sale itself was enormous: 132 F-16 Cs and 28 F-16 Ds at a cost of $4.2
billion in 1983, sold to Turkiye for cash and a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) loan from
the Pentagon. Against this, a direct offset commitment of $150 million was signed on
May 11, 1984, committing General Dynamics (GD) to purchase components in Turkiye’s
aerospace program directly or to provide training in it (Hickok, 2000). GD agreed that
out of a total package of 160 F –16C/D, the first 8 aircraft would be delivered from the
General Dynamics/Fort Worth Division production line, the remaining 152 aircraft were
delivered from the newly establish TAI’s production line (Letter of Offer and
Acceptance, 1983). On November 9, 1984, GD signed an indirect offset commitment,
agreeing to provide services and to export products from Turkiye unrelated to the F-16 or
the aerospace program.
In addition, GD committed to fund the set up of a new aerospace company, the
Turkish Aerospace Industries Inc. (TAI). The purpose of this company, housed in a
large, newly constructed factory, was to assemble and co-produce the F-16 in Turkiye,
and to provide support for the program including research, development, design, training,
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and servicing. GD set up this company as a joint venture with Turkiye and its principal
subcontractor, General Electric Corporation (GE), which makes F-16 engines. Of the
$137 million required to fund the project, GD put in $58 million (42%), GE funded $9
million (7%), Turkiye put in $68 million (49%), and the Turkish Air Force Foundation
and Turkish Air League Administration (THK) put in the remaining $2 million (2%).
The company, TAI, was thus 51 percent Turkish owned and 49 percent U.S. owned. TAI
facilities located in Akıncı, Ankara cover an area of 2.3 million square meters with an
industrial facility of over 130.000 square meters under roof. The Company has a modern
aircraft facility, furnished with high technology machinery and equipment which provide
extensive manufacturing capabilities. Quality system of TAI meets USAF MIL-Q9858A, NATO AQAP-120 and ISO-9001 standards (Turkish Armed Forces Foundation,
2002).
General Electric helped create Tusas Engine Industries (TEI), a Turkish-American
joint stock company, to manufacture engine parts and assemble the F110-GE-100 engine
for the TAI F-16 production line. The assembly of engines and the manufacture of parts
started in 1987. This start-up phase was completed with the co-production of selected
parts by the end of 1989. Having successfully completed the start-up phase by the end of
1989, TEI moved into the mature growth phase. TEI is now mature supplier of engine
components. Initially utilizing military aircraft engine technology, throughout the years,
TEI has penetrated to commercial components markets as well. Over the past years, TEI
has developed into a very well trained diversified company, combining manufacturing,
assembly and test facilities all in one location. TEI has met all its delivery and quality
commitments and is now producing parts for several aircraft engine applications as well
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as gas turbines for customers in United States and Europe (Turkish Armed Forces
Foundation, 2002).
Lockheed Martin owned a 49% share in a Turkish firm, Microwave Electronic
Systems, Inc. (MIKES), to produce the ALQ-178-V5 radar and electronic
countermeasure systems used on the F-16. And Litton started to collaborate with the
Turkish firm Aselsan to build F-16 components (Gabelnick, 1984).
The Turkish government allowed GD to spend the $150 million direct offset
commitment on the development of a whole town around the TAI complex. This
included housing for 2,000 personnel to work in the plant, a hospital, mosque, school,
waste treatment plant, power plant, and roads, as well as job training. The F-16
production, named Peace Onyx and then Peace Onyx II, has been TAI’s primary program
and the main catalyst for the growth of Turkiye’s aerospace industry. In addition to
assembling the F-16s, TAI is manufacturing in Turkiye the aft fuselage, center fuselage,
and wings. The rest of the components are being shipped in. The first plane rolled off
the assembly line in October of 1987, ahead of schedule (Hickok, 2000). Peace Onyx
provided a ten-year plan to modernized the Turkish Air Force (TuAF), to develop an
indigenous aerospace industry, and to deepen Turkish-U.S. military relations.
As with the creation of TAI, General Dynamics requested support for the offset
commitment from its principal subcontractors, General Electric Corporation (making the
engines) and Westinghouse (providing the radar). General Dynamics has overall
responsibility for the $1.27 billion indirect offset but was able to sign separate
commitments with General Electric Corporation for $317.5 million (25%) and with
Westinghouse for $152 million (12%) (Hickok, 2000). The performance period was for
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ten years with a three-year grace period, which means that the offset was to be completed
by 1994 or, with the grace period, by 1997. There is a complex penalty formula for
noncompliance. A review period every two years was provided to smooth out the
process, so that General Dynamics does not arrive at the end with a lot of the
commitment left uncompleted. In total, General Dynamic’s obligation in Turkiye for the
F-16 was $1,008.5 million. This is a huge sum in absolute terms but represents a
relatively modest 24 percent of the actual contract value. The offset figure in General
Dynamic’s recent military sales to some European countries has easily exceeded 100
percent (Hickok, 2000).
Initially, the government laid down guidelines for the indirect offset, asking
General Dynamics to fulfill 90 percent of it through the procurement and export of
Turkish products and 10 percent through capital investment and the promotion of tourism
in Turkiye. When General Dynamics began to look around for products to export from
Turkiye, such as cotton, textiles, and orange juice concentrate, they found the process
difficult, time consuming, and expensive. General Dynamics could get only one dollar of
offset credit for each dollar of product exported. In 1984 and 1985, as the development
of TAI got underway, the Turkish authorities began to have a change of heart. They
came to believe that the investment was worth more because of its inherent leverage.
Since dollars invested in an industry (e.g., a hotel) could generate far more cash
than the original investment sum, Turkiye began to encourage General Dynamics to
invest more, even to reverse the percentage under the guidelines with 90 percent now to
be fulfilled by investment. The encouragement Turkiye provided was to award General
Dynamics offset credit based on a multiplier formula. General Dynamics thus receives

56

offset credit, to be negotiated in each case, of several times the value of its actual
investment. The leverage could be further increased since General Dynamics could use
its reputation and network to enlist the support of investment partners.
The first indirect investment was in the Ankara Hilton Hotel, followed by three
more, one each in Izmir, a port in the west; in Mersin, a port in the south; and in Istanbul
on the Bosphorus. The Istanbul hotel is the original Hilton Hotel in the country. General
Dynamic’s investment in each hotel was $2 million with additional equity put in by
foreign and local partners. The advantage to General Dynamics, if these projects worked
as planned, was that its money would generate a cash flow and eventually a profit once
the investment is paid back. GD entered into a joint venture with Sabanci Holding (local
partner) and Hilton International to open Hilton Hotels under the name of HiltonSa
Company in Turkiye. HiltonSa Hotels had been opened in Ankara, Izmir, Istanbul and
Mersin as an offset commitment by the year of 1993 (Cakiroglu, 2002).
General Dynamics had put together another investment project in Turkiye with
Bechtel, the giant U.S. engineering and construction firm based in San Francisco.
General Dynamics invested about $20 million in a billion dollar thermal power plant
project. Bechtel lead the construction but was joined on a subcontract basis by other
investment partners, Combustion Engineering of the United States, Siemens of Germany,
and Royal Dutch Shell. General Dynamics expected to get $250-300 million in offset
credit for this project, and the government guaranteed a 15-20 percent return on
investment (Hickok, 2000).

57

Peace Onyx II
TAI would not remain viable without additional F-16 production on terms
substantially different from the first program. The original Peace Onyx had achieved the
goal of transferring the necessary technology and know-how to establish a Turkish
aerospace industry. This potential was not sustainable without the acquisition of further
aircraft. The second co-production program of F-16 fighters—Peace Onyx II—was
signed on 26 March 1992. At first, the contract called for the purchase of 34 F-16C and 6
F-16D Block 50 aircraft with a total estimated cost of $1.515 billion. In 11 February
1994, the contract changed with an amendment to the letter of offer and acceptance
reflecting the shift from 40 to 80 aircraft to produce (Hickok, 2000). The funding of the
first 40 planes met primarily by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the Emirates. A direct offset
commitment of $133.7 million was signed, committing General Electric (GE) to purchase
components in Turkiye’s aerospace program directly. Within this project, overall
responsibility for the $256.2 million indirect offset commitment was able to sign.
Maintenance hangars for F-100, F-129 and CT-7 engines were built and training was
provided by General Electric for TuAF (TUSIAD, 1999). The additional of enhanced
radar systems for better air-to-ground targeting with standoff precision guided weapons, a
missionized cockpit, and improved data links would give the Turkish Air Force an allweather, night-capable aircraft. A Peace Onyx follow-on would continue to provide
Turkiye with a versatile military capability to defend itself against attack by its neighbors
or to provide strategic deterence well into the twenty-first century.

58

Peace Vector IV
In addition to the Peace Onyx program TAI produced 46 F-16 fighters with a new
program— Peace Vector IV —for the Egyptian Air Force between 1993 and 1995 under
the agreement signed between the Governments of Turkiye, the U.S.A. and the Arab
Republic of Egypt. This program is significant as it was the first delivery of F-16s to a
third country from a manufacturer outside the U.S.A. (Barber, 2000).

Summary
TAI completed a total of 152 Block 30/40 F-16C/Ds for the TuAF (plus 8
delivered directly from the USA) under the Peace Onyx I, 80 Block 50 F-16C/Ds (68 Cs
and 12 Ds) was placed under the Peace Onyx II, plus an additional 34 Block 40 Cs and
12 Block 40 Ds built for the Egyptian Air Force. The total is 278 F-16C/Ds for the
TuAF, 46 aircraft for Egypt. The last license-built F-16 from TAI was delivered to the
TuAF on November 13, 1999 (Cebeci, 1999). Turkiye is negotiating on the assembly of
32 additional F-16's. Twenty of them would have reconnaissance pods. Some of these
are believed to be attrition replacements. But project is on hold due to economical
problems in Turkiye (Cakmakci, 2002).
The Turkish Air Force Command is offering to lease its older F-16C/D Block 30
fighters to Hungary in the hope that it can replace them with new Block 50 aircraft
(Enginsoy, 2001).
The Peace Onyx story of force modernization clearly is one of success. The
Turkish military achieved modernization at a relatively low financial price, but the true
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cost of the Peace Onyx story in terms of industrial competiveness and relations with the
United States remains uncounted.

4.4.3 Main Battle Tank Project
The Government of Turkiye continues to look toward Western defense industry
for co-production and joint venture opportunities for political and budgetary reasons.
The main battle tank (MBT) project has been launched in order to meet the requirement
of the Turkish Land Forces Command (TLFC) for main battle tanks with maximum local
content. Accordingly, in-country production of 1000 tanks has been planned. Aside
from the manufacture of 1,000 main battle tanks, the project would also encompass the
modernization of 900 existing U.S. General Dynamics-made M-60 A1 tanks. The MBT
project is one of the Turkish military’s top three programs, along with multibillion-dollar
deals to buy attack helicopters and airborne early warning and control aircraft from U.S.
companies.
Turkiye's largest planned procurement project is the local production of 1,000
new tanks in a project estimated to be worth about $7 billion. The request for proposal
(RFP) concerning the production of first batch consisting of 250 tanks has been
forwarded on 6 September 1999 to the following companies determined as the national
contractor candidates (SSM, 2001a):
1. ASMAŞ Ağır Sanayii Makinaları A.Ş.
2. BMC Sanayii ve Ticaret A.Ş.
3. FNSS Savunma Sistemleri A.Ş.
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4. OTOKAR Otobüs Karoseri Sanayii A.Ş.
5. ROKETSAN Roket Sanayii ve Ticaret A.Ş.
A group of sample tanks has undergone field tests in Turkiye and the performance
evaluation of France's Giat Leclerc, Germany's Krauss-Maffei Wegmann Leopard 2A6,
Italy's Alenia/OtoBreda Ariete, and Ukraine's Ukrspetsexport T-84 was completed in year
2000. An evaluation of a U.S. General Dynamics M1A2 equipped with a diesel engine
has been completed.
The Turkish lira has lost a quarter of its value against the U.S. dollar since
Turkiye decided 21 February 2001 to let the currency float freely in international markets
(Bekdil, 2001). The decision scrapped the government’s earlier pre-determined exchange
rate for the lira based on a currency basket of the dollar and the euro. Turkiye has started
to curb its defense spending and reshuffle procurement programs because of the currency
crisis resulting from the government recovery plan with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). Because of the government's new anti-inflation program, spending on the main
battle tank program was spread over the next 15 years. But for the lucrative tank bid, the
first order of 250 tanks would be finalized with a total cost of $1.7 billion. The project
was scheduled for finalization by 2013 (Reuters, 2000). Turkiye at some point would
proceed with the main battle tank co-production project, but probably the size would be
reduced (Bekdil, 2000f).
According to the M-60 A1 tank modernization program, Turkiye has given
priority to the modernization of its U.S. General Dynamics-made M-60 A1 tanks due to
delays in the co-production of the third generation main battle tanks. The United States
donated more than 900 M60A1s to Turkiye in the early 1990s as part of a NATO
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program to assist the alliance members. Upgrading the entire fleet could cost more than
$2.5 billion (Enginsoy, 2001). The M-60 A1 tank of U.S. General Dynamics Land
Systems has been competing against the state-owned Israel Military Industries (IMI) for
Turkiye's M-60 tank modernization project, although Turkiye has only been negotiating
with IMI as part of efforts to further develop its strategic ties with Israel.
(Sariibrahimoglu, 2001). Negotiations involve significant technology transfer and offset
arrangements. One possible option is for a few Turkish M60s to be upgraded in Israel
and the rest modernized in Turkiye. The bulk of that work in Turkiye would be done at
an Army repair and maintenance center in Kayseri in Central Anatolia, with some work
handled by the military electronics company Aselsan Elektronik Sanayi A.S. Aselsan has
experience since they won a contract from the Defense Ministry to upgrade the Army’s
170 German-made Leopard I tanks. The Leopards and M60s form the backbone of the
service’s Main Battle Tank fleet (Opall-Rome, 2000). As an offset commitment, Israel
plans to buy 50m cubic meters of water from Turkiye each year, estimated to be worth
about $50-75m over 10 years, though the price is still subject to negotiation (Shanson,
2001).
Contract negotiations with IMI collapsed in the late November 2001. The deal
centered on upgrades to 170 M60A1 tanks, the first batch of a fleet of more than 900
M60s. After arguments over price sank contract talks with Israel, Turkiye decided to cut
the contract negotiations with IMI. The Israeli negotiating team simply could not bridge
the wide gaps between technological capabilities expected by SSM and price limitations
imposed on the program. IMI refused to go below about $700 million while the SSM
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insisted on paying less than $500 million (Enginsoy, 2001a). It seems that the
cancellation will cause a delay of at least one year in the effort to modernize the M60s.
Turkiye is preparing to offer a new tender. U.S., French, Ukrainian, and German
companies, as well as a few Turkish firms would be willing to compete in a new fresh
tender. U.S. tank manufacturer General Dynamics Land Systems, Sterling Heights,
Mich. Has already approached the Turkish government in an effort to win the right to
improve some of Turkiye’s M60 main battle tanks (Enginsoy, 2001). General Dynamics
Land Systems (GDLS) has developed an upgrade of the M-60, called the 120S, which
includes claimed survivability as well as accuracy upgrades, providing performance
similar to the M1A1. "The 120S makes existing M-60 fleets relevant by increasing their
capability to close to that of the M1A1 Abrams tank’s performance, at half the price,"
Henry Umanos, director of GD's 120S program, said: "Its commonality with the Abrams
tank family of vehicles easily offers future growth opportunities to evolve into a new
main battle tank program." The GD’s upgrade integrates key systems from the M1A1.
This includes the M1A1 120 mm turret, equipped with a 240X4 Forward Looking
Infrared Radar (FLIR), onto an upgraded M-60 chassis. The upgraded M-60 also
contains an M1A1 suspension system. The modernized chassis is said to improve
firepower accuracy. Moreover, the upgraded M-60 contains a turret protected with
advanced armor. The turret was successfully demonstrated to the Turkish Main Battle
Tank Committee. The GDLS offer is half the price of IMI's bid. But this calculation
depends on Turkiye's choice of an engine for the M-60. GD has recommended the 1200horsepower AVDS-1790 engine to reproduce the mobility of the latest model M1A2.
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Such an engine would significantly raise the price of the M-60 upgrade (Middle East
News Line, 2001).
Turkey decided to restart negotiations with IMI-TAAS over the tank
modernization deal in January 2002, after having asked it to lower its price to from $1
billion to $550-650 million. Turkiye has awarded TAAS-Israel Industries the tender for
modernizing 170 of its US-made M-60 tanks, ending a years-long dilemma over the fate
of the aging weapons. The contract, which includes the transfer of technology to develop
third-generation tanks, is worth some $668 million (Demir, 2002).
The tanks will be modernized in a Turkish military factory in the central
Anatolian town of Kayseri; subcontracted Turkish firms Aselsan and MKE will provide
local input. The engine thrust, fire, and maneuverability of the tanks will be renovated
with computerized systems.

4.4.4 ATAK Helicopter Project
The ATAK helicopter project is managed by the Undersecretariat for Defence
Industries (SSM) in coordination with the Turkish Land Forces (TLF) and the Chief of
General Staff. The purpose of the project is to secure 145 tactical reconnaissance and
attack helicopters for the needs of the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF). The ATAK
helicopter project, a vital part of the modern defense force of the Turkish Armed Forces
(TAF), will be another concrete example of the demonstrated ability of the Turkish
defense industry in the field of aviation industry. The studies started at the end of 1996
(SSM, 2001b).
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Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) has been selected as the prime contractor for
the project. These helicopters will be acquired by maximum in-country production under
license. This agreement is expected to further develop Turkiye’s current infrastructure of
defense industry, as well as helicopter design, development, production, testing system
integration, and logistics support capabilities including depot-level maintenance.
By the successful completion of the process of preparing a joint proposal with
five foreign companies in the first period, TAI created an environment for the
participation of 114 local companies in the project in order to contribute to the
development of the local industry (SSM, 2001b). In past years, the defense industry
acquired production capabilities for the following state-of-the-art devices: UHF/VHF
Radio, FLIR, MFD, IFF, STINGER, and INS/GPS. These components are currently
being used on many different air platforms of the TAF. Standardization among forces
will be achieved through the use of these same devices under the ATAK project. In
addition, in-country production capabilities of defence industry will be used at a
maximum level and additional capabilities will be obtained.
On 21 July 2000, The Defence Industry Executive Committee (SSİK) decided for
SSM to begin contract negotiations with the Bell Helicopter Textron Company.
Currently, the negotiations (executed among the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries
(SSM)-TAI, Bell, and other local companies) have been accelerated. Also the
negotiations with Bell Helicopter Textron Company are continuing. The negotiations of
the significant portions of the agreements and its appendices have been completed. The
initial requirement is for 50 aircraft, worth an estimated $1.5 billion (according to Bell),
but the numbers produced could eventually rise to 145 in two more batches of 50 and 45.
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Turkiye already operates Bell AH-1W Super Cobras, from which the AH-1Z is being
developed (Barber, 2000).
TAI, with Bell acting as principal subcontractor, will build most of the aircraft in
Turkiye. Besides manufacture and assembly, TAI will create and coordinate the overall
technology transfer effort, TAI will also be responsible for ensuring that Turkish content
meets the government’s 50% goal. Around 140 major subsystems on which Turkish and
foreign companies could collaborate have been identified. The principal subcontractor
for avionics is the Turkish defense electronics contractor Aselsan (which was founded by
the Turkish Armed Forces Foundation). Aselsan has previously undertaken offsetgenerated work with Raytheon and Rockwell Collins. SSM is in charge of the program
overall. A statement from the SSM argued, “Through the procurement of 145 helicopters
by in-country production under license, not only Turkiye’s current infrastructure of
defense industry will develop but also logistics support capabilities such as helicopter
design, development, production, system integration, and depot-level maintenance will be
acquired” (Barber, 2000).
TAI, as a prime contractor, will include the local defense companies in the process
with SSM’s support. It will thus contribute to the national economy, and display efficient
customer-seller teamwork with SSM, purchasing authority, on the way to going beyond
the requirements of TAF. Through the well-planned and carefully implemented
activities, TAI should enable Turkiye to gain the following capabilities (TAI's Voice,
2001):
•

Complete helicopter production

•

Mechanical-avionics modification and modernization on helicopters
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•

Design & Development activities of the helicopters

•

“Integrated Logistic Support” for supporting the product through its life cycle

“In terms of basic helicopter technology, Turkiye wants to be able to make
and test critical components such as gears and gearboxes, rotor and other
dynamic components, and landing gear. Obtaining licenses and the rights
to sell aircraft to certain third countries is TAI’s responsibility” (Barber,
2000).
But uncertainties regarding parts warranties, the level of technology transfer to Turkiye,
and the right to export to third countries threaten to slow down negotiations over The
ATAK Helicopter Project.
Because of the government's new anti-inflation program, spending on the ATAK
helicopter project was spread over the next 15 years (Reuters, 2000). Turkiye and Bell
Helicopter launched contract negotiations for the chopper deal in September 2000, but
the talks were stalled several times by Turkish demands to indigenously develop a
national mission computer for the AH-1Zs. The U.S. Department of Defense declared on
June 2001 that it would not allowed a Turkish-developed mission computer aboard U.S.designed helicopters (Enginsoy, 2002). Turkiye and U.S. agreed that the mission
computer for the proposed AH-1Z fleet would be developed jointly by Northrop
Grumman Litton and Turkiye’s stated-owned Scientific and Technical Research Institute
(TUBITAK). The prelimary deal shuts out other potential Turkish participants that were
proposed during earlier rounds of negotiations by Turkish defense authorities, including
military electronics manufacturer Aselsan, state-run software company STM and
electronics concern Ayesas, all based in Ankara. Final co-production contract with Bell
Textron expect to be signed in May 2002. Most of the co-production work would be
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carried out at TAI. Bell Textron will manufacture the first three or four helicopters in the
U.S. and the rest will be co-produced in Turkiye (Enginsoy, 2002).

4.5 Conclusions
Although not always easy to predict, the future picture for Turkiye’s industries is
quite clear: continuation along the path to modernization. The political and military
leadership of Turkiye has made it abundantly clear that they place a high priority on
ensuring that the Turkish armed forces remain completely capable and fully prepared to
carry out its national defense missions, its NATO missions, and future requests by the
United Nations in its many peacekeeping roles. In addition, this modernization of
military and industrial capability will be achieved through continued and increased
emphasis on offsets. For major co-production projects, the following aspects are
considered vital points during the evaluation process: technology transfer, offers for
research and development in plants and facilities to be established in Turkiye, amount of
national content, and net flow currency abroad. SSM will be obligated to take concrete
measures and to attach utmost importance to offsets programs. In this regard, directing
defense equipment purchases towards indigenous defense industry to the maximum
extent possible, as well as introducing new technologies with export opportunities will be
key factors in evaluating future offset proposals.
Turkiye is trying to utilize the technologies that Turkish defense industry has
gained by technology transfer with offsets. For example, Turkiye developed “J” missile, a
Turkish version of Chinese M-7 missile by the Turkish plant Roketsan A.S. in 2001
(Cakirozer, 2002). Roketsan A.S. developed the missile “J” with technology transfer
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from China. It is a good example to see that technologies can be adapted to Turkiye’s
current and developing industrial system.
The Turkish Air Force of the 21st century will be stronger and more capable in
every area. Not only will future TUAF modernization efforts result in greater force
capability, they will expand Turkiye’s manufacturing and technological base, increase
TuAF interoperability within NATO, and broaden Turkiye’s participation in multinational peacekeeping operations. As with any military force in transition the years
ahead will offer numerous challenges. Fortunately, the TAFC leadership is adept at
navigating the political and fiscal obstacles, which threaten to stifle sustained growth in
force capability.
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5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter summarizes the results of the research effort described herein and
offers conclusions and suggestions based on the facts presented. The research focuses on
the offset experience of Turkiye and some of her offset applications. To this end, each
specific investigative question posed in Chapter I will be addressed in light of the
information presented in Chapters III through IV. Finally, recommendations for further
research will be presented.
5.2 Conclusions and Recommendations
A major lesson of recent technological development in the military arena is that
states that have determined that their national security is at stake will commit significant
resources in order to attain the weapons they view as necessary to preserve that security.
The production capabilities of the Turkish defense industry and the particular structure
they imply for the design of defense procurement indicate that the offset implementations
significantly contribute to the development of the country’s defense industry. Offset is a
well-established process of technology acquisition through collaboration and joint
ventures. From the description in the preceding chapters of the policy development and
the terms of offsets applications which accompanied the large defense procurement
contracts of the last decade, it becomes evident that the offset practice might contribute to
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the promotion of co-production programs and the exports as well as the creation of job
opportunities in the Turkish defense industry.
For example, the F-16 offset agreement created very good amount of job
opportunities for the national defense industry. 1926 personnel work at TAI as of
February 2002, consisting of 1098 technicians, 828 administrative. Total number of
engineers is 413 and 97 of them have their PhDs and/or master degrees (TAI, 2002). In
1992, TAI gave training for 500 Korean workers who are from newly built General
Dynamics’ F-16 plant in Korea (FAS, 2002). Another example is FNSS Savunma
Sistemleri A.Ş, an American-Turkish joint venture company. 370 people work at FNSS
as of December 2000, consisting of 60 engineers, 40 executives, 145 technicians and 120
administrative personnel as well as five personnel with military background (FNSS,
2002). As a result, Turkiye has gained a quality labor force for her national defense
industry by the offset deals.
The Undersecretariat of the Defense Industry (SSM) is the only and most
experienced government agency in Turkiye equipped with power to administer military
offsets. SSM seeks a transfer of technology, whether through direct investment, coproduction, licensing or know-how arrangements. In the area of purchases of Turkish
goods, preferences are being given to the defense and technology oriented sectors. For
future defense deals, when other conditions are equivalent, Turkiye will opt for countries
that are providing higher technology transfer. Technology transfer and approval of
export licenses – together with Turkiye’s right to export defense equipment to third
countries – became crucial factors in determining the country’s future defense contracts.
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Technology transfer needs an environment in which it can succeed. The systems which
allow technology to be absorbed must be developed before transfer can take place. As
Turkiye chose a market-based system, this means the development of a market economy
in which businessmen see and pursue opportunities to profit from the technology
available. The success of offset programs in Turkiye will inevitably depend in part on the
extent to which the prerequisite has been or can be met.
Offset is a good way to increase the production opportunities and capabilities of
the industry, led by the defense industry in Turkiye, within the framework of the
procurement of goods and services required by the Turkish Armed Forces or other public
institutions in the field of the defense industry, from abroad or through domestic
production by means of joint ventures and to increase the existing market shares in the
international arena and to provide for the balance of payments.
Proposals and quotations submitted to Undersecretariat for Defense Industries
(SSM) or the Turkish Ministry of Defense (MSB) are first evaluated to ensure technical
compliance with Turkish Armed Forces operational requirements. For major coproduction projects, the following aspects are considered vital points during the
evaluation process: technology transfer, offers for research and development in plants
and facilities to be established in Turkiye, amount of national content, and net currency
flow abroad.
In addition, it is important that bid packages offer direct and indirect offset
programs. The “Offset Guidelines” (prepared in 2000) place almost exclusive interest on
direct offsets. Almost every defense project announced by the SSM calls for an offset
proposal which is included in the request for proposal (RFP) document related to the
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project. Companies should carefully study the offset requirements detailed in the RFP
document.
Within the framework of the offset programs carried out by the MSB and the
SSM the basic objectives are:
1. To export the defense industry products and priority industry products and to
provide foreign currency inflow to Turkiye through foreign capital
investments (new or extension) and thus provide the return of the foreign
currency to the economy of Turkiye to the maximum extent of the foreign
currency that will go abroad as a result of the project costs;
2. To provide savings on foreign currencies through the creation of new
domestic production capabilities by technology transfer determined within the
framework of the requirements as well as by making use of the increases to be
provided for the existing production;
3. To provide for the carrying out of the projects efficiently for a long period of
time by creating new fields of work and domestic added value and to provide
for the industries established to become self-sufficient; and
4. To increase the standards of quality and efficiency levels of the existing
industry and the industries that will be established through technology transfer
and exports and thus, to increase the competitive power of the Turkish
economy in the international arena.
According to MSB and the SSM’s basic objectives, limited number of joint
ventures companies exports some defense industry products and provide foreign currency
inflow to Turkiye. For example, in addition to serving the Turkish Armed Forces, a
significant objective of FNSS is to provide exports opportunities to Turkiye. FNSS
established its first exports relation with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1997. A
total of 133 armored engineering squad vehicles, armored recovery vehicles, armored
artillery forward observation vehicles were built and delivered to UAE under the
agreement signed. Deliveries started in early 1999 and were completed in February 2001
(FNSS, 2002).
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From now on the cooperation between the MSB and the SSM will be more
effective with the new directive submitted on 12 May 2000 which explains principles of
offset implementations in the Turkish Defense Industry procurements, to apply offsets
within procurement of goods and services required by the Turkish Armed Forces and
other public institutions in the field of the defense industry.
SSM is the only government agency in Turkiye equipped with power to
administer military offsets. The Foreign Trade Undersecretariat, on the other hand, is
responsible for offset programs in nonmilitary procurements. Sometimes, it is possible to
see some defense related offset programs which are carried out by the Foreign Trade
Undersecretariat. How the coordination between SSM and the Foreign Trade
Undersecretariat will be is not clearly known, and sometimes no coordination can be seen
between each other. Sometimes, this situation causes problems such as unwanted delays
in contract negotiations. However, some offset related procurements for a government
company as Turkish Airlines followed by Foreign Trade Undersecretariat can be done in
defense industry plants like TAI, TEI, Aselsan, and Havelsan. It can be accomplished
with a little coordination between SSM and the Foreign Trade Undersecretariat. The
example of some B-737 plane parts production for Turkish Airlines in TAI in 1998 can
show us that with coordination between SSM and the Foreign Trade Undersecretariat,
both agencies can gain some benefits in offset agreements (TUSIAD, 1999).
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Turkish F-16 Offsets and Licensed Production
Peace Onyx I:
TAI manufactured and delivered 152 F-16C/D aircraft in Block 30 and 40
configurations at the TAI Facilities to the Turkish Air Force under the Peace Onyx I
Program between the years 1987-1995. The Program covers 160 F-16s, eight of which
were produced at the General Dynamics, Fort Worth facilities and delivered to TuAF.
Under this program, TAI manufactured 70% of the airframe of the F-16 aircraft including
aft and center fuselages and wings.
Peace Onyx II:
Within the framework of the follow-on program Peace Onyx II, TAI produced an
additional 80 F-16C/D aircraft in Block 50 configuration during the 1995-1999 period for
TuAF. With this program, the manufacturing share of the company reached 80% with
the addition of flaperons and the stuffing tasks for the forward fuselage to the airframe
components manufactured in the first program.
Peace Vector IV:
TAI produced 46 F-16s for the Egyptian Air Force between 1993 and 1995 under
the agreement signed between the Governments of Turkiye, the U.S.A. and the Arab
Republic of Egypt. This program is significant as it was the first delivery of F-16s to a
third country from a manufacturer outside the U.S.A. The F-16 offset agreement clearly
is one of the first successful offsest experience in Turkiye. With this project Turkiye
gained a very important military-industrial complexes, TAI and TEI, for her defense
industry. In addition to assembling the F-16s, TAI manufactured in Turkiye the aft
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fuselage, center fuselage, and wings. In this regard, the F-16 offset agreement introduced
new technologies with export opportunities to Turkish defense industry. TAI produced
and sold 46 F-16 fighters with Peace Vector IV program for the Egyptian Air Force
between 1993 and 1995. TAI' s experience includes not only F-16 Fighting Falcon, CN235 Light Transport Aircraft, SF-260 Primary Trainers, AS-532 Utility Helicopters, but
also design and development of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV-X1), Target Drones,
Fighter-Surveillance Aircraft, Agriculture Aircraft and modernization activities. As a full
member of Airbus Military Company, TAI is continuing with improvement activities of
The Future Large Aircraft (FLA) with six members of the Independent European
Program Group (Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, 2002).
In addition to part manufacturing, TEI benefited from depot level maintenance
capability establishment for miscellaneous engines and received training in critical
defense fields. TEI has met all its delivery and quality commitments and is now
producing parts for over 17 aircraft engine applications as well as gas turbines, for local
customers and international customers in the United States and Europe (TEI, 2002).
Today, these factories are providing support for some current offsets programs
including research, development, design, training, and servicing. The Turkish military
achieved modernization at a relatively low financial price, but the true cost of the F-16
offset agreement in terms of technology transfer, the creation of job opportunities in the
Turkish defense industry and relations with the United States remains uncounted.
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Main Battle Tank Project
Turkiye is evaluating proposals for a $7 billion project to build 1,000 tanks for the
Turkish army, the second largest in NATO, aside from the manufacture of 1,000 main
battle tanks, the project would also encompass the modernization of 650 existing tanks.
Because of the government's new anti-inflation program, spending on the main battle
tank program will be spread over the next 15 years. Turkiye at some point will proceed
with the main battle tank co-production project, but probably the size will be reduced
(Bekdil, 2000f).
Turkiye has given priority to the modernization of its M-60 A1 tanks due to
delays in the co-production of the third generation main battle tanks. Turkiye had been
negotiating with the state-owned Israel Military Industries (IMI) for Turkiye's M-60 tank
modernization project (Sariibrahimoglu, 2001). Negotiations involved significant
technology transfer and offset arrangements. One possible option was for a few Turkish
M60s to be upgraded in Israel and the rest modernized in Turkiye. The bulk of that work
in Turkiye would be done at an Army repair and maintenance center in Kayseri in Central
Anatolia, with some work handled by the military electronics company Aselsan. As an
indirect offset commitment, Israel planed to buy 50m cubic meters of water from Turkiye
each year, estimated to be worth about $50-75m over 10 years (Shanson, 2001).
Contract negotiations with IMI collapsed in the late November 2001 because of
gaps between technological capabilities expected by SSM and price limitations imposed
on the program (Enginsoy, 2001a). Turkiye is preparing to offer a new tender. U.S.,
French, Ukrainian, and German companies, as well as a few Turkish firms would be
willing to compete in a new fresh tender.
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Turkey decided to restart negotiations with IMI-TAAS over the tank
modernization deal in January 2002, after having asked it to lower its price to from $1
billion to $550-650 million. Turkiye has awarded TAAS-Israel Industries the tender for
modernizing 170 of its US-made M-60 tanks, ending a years-long dilemma over the fate
of the aging weapons. The contract, which includes the transfer of technology to develop
third-generation tanks, is worth some $668 million (Demir, 2002).

ATAK Helicopter Project
In July 2000, Turkey chose Bell’s King Cobra as its new attack helicopter. The
King Cobra beat Eurocopter’s Tiger and IAI Kamov’s Ka-50-2 Erdogan, a variant of the
Ka-50 Black Shark, after other aircraft including Boeing’s Apache Longbow were
eliminated earlier. The initial requirement is for 50 aircraft, worth an estimated $1.5
billion according to Bell, but the numbers produced could eventually rise to 145 in two
more batches of 50 and 45. Turkiye already operates Bell AH-1W SuperCobras, from
which the AH-1Z is being developed.
Most of the aircraft will be built in Turkiye by TAI, with Bell acting as principal
subcontractor. TAI also assembles Black Hawks and Cougars for the Turkish armed
forces. Besides manufacture and assembly, TAI will create coordinate the overall
technology transfer effort and will be responsible for ensuring that Turkish content meets
the government’s 50 percent goal. Around 140 major subsystems on which Turkish and
foreign companies could collaborate have been identified. Turkiye and U.S. agreed that
the mission computer for the proposed AH-1Z fleet would be developed jointly by
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Northrop Grumman Litton and Turkiye’s stated-owned Scientific and Technical Research
Institute (TUBITAK).
In overall charge of the program is the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries,
known as the SSM. Through the procurement of 145 helicopters by in-country
production under license, not only Turkiye’s current infrastructure of defense industry
will develop but also logistics support capabilities such as helicopter design,
development, production, system integration, and depot-level maintenance will be
acquired.
As a summary of this research, the following recommendations are made:
1. There must be more coordination between SSM and the Foreign Trade
Undersecretariat.
2. Co-production seems to be the most promising acquisition strategy and should
be used under these following conditions:
a. If a system to be produced is highly complex,
b. If a system requires advanced technology (higher than Turkish industry
capabilities,
c. If a system might involve complex and costly research and development
activities.
3. In order to take advantage of economies of scale in production, Turkiye
should look to produce more than just their own requirement. This could also
be termed using an “export-oriented” policy vice an “import substitution”
policy.
4. To become an arms producer very quickly, Turkiye should utilize the
technologies that Turkish defense industry has gained by technology transfer
with offsets. Technologies should be adaptable to its current and developing
industrial system.
5. Research and development studies in Turkiye have less value in offset
agreements besides technology transfer, the creation of job opportunities in
the Turkish defense industry. When we increase research and development
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studies, with the co-production strategy, research and development cost would
be shared with at least two nations.
6. More export opportunities with offset agreements can be a good chance to
find a way to procure new projects in the future.
7. Co-production provides very fairly good amount of job opportunities for the
national defense industry. However, job opportunities provided by coproduction will depend on what percentage of the overall system is produced
in Turkiye. SSM should have look for more production opportunities in
country in future offsets.
8. Contribution of offset benefits to national defense is very high. Arms
production with offset acquisition strategy should bring new defense industry
capabilities to Turkiye and increase level of Turkiye’s defense capability. So,
technology of the arms to be produced should add to the current military
capability. In addition, they should not be only prestige weapons to produce,
should meet a real Turkish military need. So, consistency on future
procurements for offsets is necessary.
5.3 Areas for Further Research
Turkish offset policy and how this policy is employed in F-16 offset agreement,
main battle tank project and ATAK helicopter project are my focus in this research. I
analyzed how and why Turkish offset policy developed and how offsets are employed on
these specific projects.
The main battle tank project and ATAK helicopter project are not completed yet.
Because of price limitations, higher technological transfer expectations, economical
problems in Turkiye, projects are still going on and SSM is negotiating with different
companies. Accordingly, further tracking and study is suggested as the projects progress,
in order to find how the offsets are employed according to Turkish offset policy, as well
as to validate the conclusions drawn in this study.
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In addition to the projects which have been analyzed in this research, one of the
big projects of SSM, four airborne early warning and control aircraft project, worth US
$1-1.5 billion, can be a good area to search for offsets for the future research.
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APPENDIX A. Abbreviations and Vocabulary
ACV
AECA
AFIT
AFD
AW
CASA
C4I
DoD
DISAM
DOC
ESF
FAS
FAR
FLIR
FMFP
FMS
FY
GAO
GD
GDLS
GE
IAI
IMET
IMF
IMI
ITAR
JDW
L/C
LTAE
MAP
MBT
MIKES
MSB
NATO
RFP
SAR
SECDEF
SSİK
SSM
STM
TAF
TAFC

Armored Combat Vehicle
Arms Export Control Act
Air Force Institute of Technology
Air Force Directorate
Aviation Week
Construcciones Aeronauticas SA (Spanish)
Command, Control, Communication, Computers, and Intelligence
Department of Defense
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management
Department of Commerce
Economic Support Fund
The Federation of American Scientists
Federal Acquisition Regulation
Forward Looking Infrared Radar
Foreign Military Financing Program
Foreign Military Sales
Fiscal Year
Government Accounting Office
General Dynamics Company
General Dynamics Land Systems
General Electric Corporation
Israeli Aerospace Industries, Ltd.
International Military Education and Training
International Monetary Fund
Israel Military Industries
International Traffic in Arms Regulations
Jane's Defense Weekly
Letter of Credit
Light Transport Aircraft Engine
Military Assistance Program
Main Battle Tank
Microwave Electronic Systems, Inc.
Ministry of National Defense (MND)
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
Request for Proposal
Search and Rescue
Secretary of Defense
The Defence Industry Executive Committee
Savunma Sanayi Müsteşarlığı
Defense Technology Engineering Inc.
Turkish Armed Forces
Turkish Air Force Command
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TAI
TEI
TGS
THK
TLF
TLFC
TUBITAK
TuAF
TUSIAD
UAE
UAV
UDI
UN
USAF
USG
USSR
WMD

Turkish Aerospace Industry, Inc.
Tusas Engine Industries, Inc.
Turkish General Staff
Turkish Air League Administration
Turkish Land Forces
Turkish Land Forces Command
Scientific and Technical Research Institute
Turkish Air Force
Türk Sanayicileri ve İşadamlari Derneği
United Arab Emirates
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
Undersecretariat for Defense Industries
United Nations
United States Air Force
United States Government
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Weapons of Mass Destruction
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APPENDIX B. Undersecretariat for Defense Industries Offset
Guidelines, 1991

UNDERSECRETARIAT FOR DEFENCE
INDUSTRIES
OFFSET GUIDELINES

ANKARA 1991
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1.

PURPOSE

1.1.

The purpose of this guideline is to set forth the principles for the definition,
classification and evaluation of offset transactions related to defence acquisition
programs in which MND/SSM is acquiring goods and services from foreign
sources or from domestic sources through co-production programs. This guideline
also describes the procedures for implementation of offset transactions. The offset
transactions described in this guideline are intended to increase the market share
and the international competitiveness and capabilities of domestic industries, in
particular of the defence industry.

1.2.

The main objectives for the MND/SSM offset programs are :
a. To increase foreign currency inflows either by exporting defence industry
products and other related industrial Turkish products or by foreign capital
investments in order to compensate for the foreign currency outflows incurred
for the financing of defence industry projects.
b. To save foreign currency by transferring technology and creating both new
production capabilities and increasing existing production.
c. To ensure established industries self-sufficiency and to enable projects to be
implemented in a productive way by creating new business opportunities and
Turkish added value.
d. To improve quality, standardisation and productivity of the existing industries
and also industries to be established through technology transfer and export
sales, and in this way to increase international competitiveness of the Turkish
economy as a whole.

2.

SCOPE :
Direct and indirect offset agreements entered into with companies participating in
MND/SSM tenders are subject to the principles set forth in this guideline.

3.

DEFINITIONS :

3.1

Abbreviations:
R&D:
RFP:
SSM:
TBD:

Research and Development
Request for proposal
Undersecretaries for Defence Industries
To be determined.
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3.2. OFFSET CONCEPT :
Defence industry related exports and any other kinds of foreign currency inflows
secured pursuant to agreement in order to compensate for the foreign currency
shortfall occurring as a result of foreign currency payments in the framework of
MND/SSM projects are treated as “Offset”.
The following items, apart from the prime contract, are accepted as offset:
a. New or expanded foreign capital investments.
b. License, know - how and technology transfer.
c. Training opportunities both in Turkey and abroad proposed and financed by the
contractor for Turkish citizens and approved by MND/SSM.
d. Research and development work opportunities and funds created by the
contractor for Turkish universities and/or other research institutions.
e. Investment by the contractor in industrial companies to establish and operate
R&D facilities particularly to develop prototypes.
f. Capital contribution of the contractor to foreign companies established and/or
participated in by Turkish manufacturing companies whose technological
development and exports enjoy priorities and for the purpose of marketing their
products in international markets provided that MND/SSM prior approval is
obtained.
g. Export of Turkish defence or related industry products and services to defence
industries in contractors' country via foreign companies with Turkish capital
share participation by Turkish defence and/or related industrialists.
h. Exports to be realised by new or expanded investments and any other alternative
long-term export possibilities created by the contractor.
i. Turkish defence and related industries exports, government to government sales
and sale of machinery, equipment and spare parts within the framework of
MND/SSM projects to foreign Ministries of Defence and international defence
institutions.
j. Transportation of goods with Turkish flag carriers ie. insurance on net value
added basis, transportation and freight costs.
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3.3. DIRECT OFFSET:
Direct offsets are goods and services exported by the main and/or subcontractors
nominated in the prime contract either to the country of contractor or to third
countries. The goods and services to be exported may include the systems, subsystems, components, parts material and services. These exports should be directly
or indirectly related with the project, it is not necessary to be the same type or
model provided that similar technology is used in their production.
3.4. INDIRECT OFFSET:
Transactions other than the ones defined as direct offset and set forth in Article 3.2
are treated as indirect offsets in the framework of MND/SSM projects.
3.5

PRIME CONTRACT :
Prime contract is the document signed establishing a project between MND/SSM
and a selected company in order to set forth the terms and conditions of procuring
certain goods and services which are not available domestically.

3.6. CONTRACTOR:
Within the framework of a MND/SSM projects any company which has
headquarters outside of Turkey which either forms a joint venture in Turkey or
which works together with a selected Turkish prime contractor and with whom
MND/SSM signs a prime contract is the contractor.
3.7. ELIGIBLE PARTY:
The following parties are eligible to fulfil the offset commitments of MND/SSM
projects:
a. Companies which are directly related with the project and which are committing
to the offset.
b. Companies at least 50 % of the voting shares of which are owned by the
contractor or their affiliates owned by these companies ie. companies at least 50
% of the voting shares of which are owned by them.
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c. Companies nominated in the offset agreement and approved by MND/SSM.
However, 50 % capital share contribution may not be required in the public
companies in which the contractor can demonstrate his control in the decision
making process. 50 % capital share contribution is also not required in case the
eligible parties are the companies stated in Article 3.2, which are defence
industry related companies. Upon the approval of MND/SSM if the contractor
owns some shares of a foreign company, this foreign company is also accepted
as eligible party.
3.8. CREDITING :
The process of deducting the value of any offset transactions realised by an eligible
party from its offset commitment.
3.9. PRE- CREDITING :
Upon the prior written consent of MND/SSM, realisation of transactions stated in
Article 3.2 by the eligible party but to be credited to the account of the contractor in
cases in which the prime contract is awarded to the contractor.
3.10.

LOCAL VALUE ADDED :

3.10.1. Local value added is the total export value of the goods or services
manufactured and performed in Turkey less the cost of all materials imported by
the eligible party and where applicable its subcontractors to perform their
relevant offset obligations. For the calculation of the import value, the books of
the eligible party and/or its subcontractors may be audited at any time by
MND/SSM.
3.10.2. In case the documents presented by the contractor are not sufficient to permit
calculation of local value added, the company may be asked for expertise
reports from Chambers of Industry.
In the event there does not exist a relevant Chamber of Industry, Chamber of
Commerce’s expertise report may be requested.
3.11. CO-PRODUCTION :
Co-production consists of production activities of the contractor with Turkish
companies in facilities existing and/or to be established in Turkey, in order to
increase the production opportunities and capabilities of Turkish industry.
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4.

MAIN PRINCIPLES :
The following principles shall be applied in evaluating and crediting offset
transactions:

4.1. In framework of the related project, user training to be given to the personnel of the
end user and production training to be provided to the Turkish subcontractors to
permit production shall not be considered within the scope of Article 3.2.
4.2. Investment type of indirect offset shall be credited provided that the equity of the
contractor shall not be transferred to any other party for a minimum of 10 years
following the investment realization.
4.3. The committed offset value will be subject to the escalation formula, which is
applied to the imported material and services portion of the prime contract.
4.4. The value of any unfulfilled offset commitment in one program year shall be added
to the next succeeding year’s offset commitment and shall be escalated accordingly.
4.5. In the event that the offset commitment shall not be fulfilled to the satisfaction of
MND/SSM one year before the completion of the prime contract, an irrevocable
letter of bank guarantee for an amount of the potential liquidated damages
calculated on the outstanding escalated offset commitments remaining to be
fulfilled shall be given by the contractor to MND/SSM. In that case, any remaining
payments to the contractor up to or equal to the amount of irrevocable letter of bank
guarantee shall be made only after the submission of that of letter bank guarantee to
MND/SSM.
4.6. Transportation cost of using Turkish flag carriers and insurance cost if insurance is
through Turkish insurance institutions shall be credited as offset of the contractor
provided that the related documents should be presented to MND/SSM.
4.7. Expenses of the Contractor or Eligible Party related to personnel and other
administrative activities and overhead and similar expenses etc. In the framework
of offset programs shall not be credited as offset.
4.8. In the event that the total value of direct off-set finally achieved would exceed the
total value of the direct offset commitment, the excess value may be credited to the
contractor’s account upon its request for the purpose of fulfilling its indirect offset
commitment related to the same project.
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4.9. In the event the total value of direct and/or indirect offset commitments finally met
would exceed the total value of the offset commitments, the excess value may be
pre-credited to the contractor’s account, upon its request, for the purpose of
fulfilling its future offset requirements. However, request for pre-crediting should
be made within 6 months after the excess value has been calculated and the right
for crediting should be utilized within 5 years following the pre-crediting. In the
event that the aforementioned requests have not been made within the said periods,
the excess of-set shall not be taken into consideration for the purpose of crediting.
4.10. Offset proposals of contractors made before signing of the prime contract may be
pre-credited in accordance with the principles set forth in this guideline.
4.11. Offset activities to be credited to the account of the contractor for its commitment
should be realized after the effectiveness of the offset agreement. However,
application of pre-crediting mechanism shall not be subject to this sub-article
requirement.
4.12. In the case of the exportation of goods produced as a result of investment type of
indirect offset activities, under the projects carried on by MND/SSM, the export
sales value added in Turkey will be credited for a maximum of 10 year period as
indirect offset at the rate of the participation of the contractor in the capital of
company.
4.13. The offset commitment for the projects carried on by MND/SSM shall not be less
than 30 % of the total value of project. However, in any case, this rate shall not be
less than 50 % of the imported cost portion of the project. For in-country coproduction projects, a minimum of 50% of the offset commitment should be direct
offset.
4.14. A multiplier of two (2) shall be applied in the favor of direct offset commitments
relative to the indirect offset commitments during MND/SSM evaluation process.
4.15. If the actual Turkish local content achieved is greater than the amount guaranteed in
the prime contract, then 100 % of the excess may be considered as indirect offset or
50 % of the excess may be considered as direct offset.
4.16. Offsets realized in the framework of MND/SSM projects may not be credited to
any company other than the contractor.
5.

BIDDING

5.1. The company committing to offset under the project carried on by MND/SSM shall
submit its offset proposal to MND/SSM within the time period stated in the RFP, as
a separate proposal from the one related to the project itself, and it shall contain the
information stated in Article 5.2. submission of an offset proposal shall mean the
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acceptance of all terms and conditions stated in this offset guideline without any
objection. The offset proposal shall not contain any condition provision-reflecting
objection to the terms and conditions stated in this guideline. (Offset proposals
containing these objections, other than the constraint stated in Article 4.13, shall not
be evaluated if such objections are not waived by the contractor within the time
limit to be given).
In case of shortfall in the proposals, the committed offset values will be taken into
consideration during the evaluations accordingly.
•

Below 50%

0.25 coefficient will be applied.

•

Between 51-75 %

0.60 coefficient well be applied

•

Between 76-99 %

0.85 coefficient will be applied.

•

100 % and above

1 coefficient will be applied.

In case of shortfall in performance then Article 7 will be applied.
5.2. Information to be included in the offset proposal:
a. Information related to the contractor and its past offset experiences,
b. Offset commitment by years (in the currency unit used in the prime contract)
c. Statement which acknowledges that application of the penalty rate and
provision stated in Article 7 are accepted unconditionally,
d. The types of direct offset committed to according to the heading in Article 3.2.
e. For training type of offsets; nature of training, duration of courses,
qualifications that trainees should have before and after the courses, detailed
schedule, cost, and parts of training which will be on-the-job or in class should
be stated (demands for crediting training cost as offset should be stated
separately),
f. Information which the Contractor believes to be useful.
5.3. Proposals shall be reviewed by MND/SSM in a pre-evaluation process. In the event
the proposal shall not match the basic offset requirements stated in this offset
guideline, companies shall be invited to resubmit and reconsideration of their offset
proposals. If the corrected resubmission has not been made within the given time
period then the offset proposal shall not be taken into consideration in the
evaluation process.
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6.

CREDITING

6.1. Offset activities shall be credited to the account of the contractor against its
commitments pursuant to the following procedures:
6.1.1. Multipliers, stated in Annex-1 shall be applied in crediting investment and
technology transfer types of offset commitments in accordance with the Article
3.2. (a) and (b). In crediting, the following shall be taken into consideration as
indirect offset at the rate of participation of the contractor in the investments:
a. Total investment amount (incentives given by the Republic of Turkey shall be
deducted from the investment amount and the balance shall be taken into
consideration).
b. The portion of profits obtained from the investment, which is kept in Turkey
and utilized for the financing of new investments.
The contractor shall submit the following information to MND SSM as regards
the investment type of offsets:
•

Type of investment,

•

Period of investment and production,

•

Whether exportation of goods or services will take place in the framework of
this investment,

•

Share of the contractor in total investment amount,

•

Information about other real and legal partners in the investment,

•

Information about the transfer of profits that are going to be gained from the
investment,

In crediting investment type of indirect offsets, the amount obtained by applying
the multipliers stated in Annex-1 to the actual amount of the investment shall be
taken into consideration.
If investment is made in the first priority regions announced in the Official
Gazette of The Republic of Turkey, then the multiplier 2.5 (two and hall) for the
investment will be added those stated in Annex-1; if investment is made in the
second priority regions, then the multipliers in Annex-1 shall be added by 2.0
(two).
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Investments which are contained in Article 3.2. (f), shall be evaluated on a case
by case basis and will be credited as approved by MND/SSM
6.1.2. For offset commitments which are contained in Article 3.2. (c), (d), (e) the
multipliers stated in Annex-2 shall be applied depending upon submission of the
related training invoices by the Contractor.
6.1.3. In the framework of Article 3.2. (g), (h), (i) export type of offsets shall be credited
on the basis of Turkish value added. The company should describe in detail the
type of goods and services and the industrial facilities in which the goods are
going to be produced.
6.1.4 Offset commitments in accordance with Article 3.2. (j) shall be multiplied by 1
(one).
6.2. In crediting technology transfer, license and know-how types of offset
commitments, actual market value and or value of the like will be taken into
consideration. This value shall be determined by MND/SSM. Technology transfer,
license and know-how should be given free of charge in order to be credited as
offset. In addition, the Turkish company to which the technology is going to be
transferred should accept to share with MND/SSM the benefits of such technology
transfer in a manner to be mutually agreed.
7.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

7.1. If offset commitments are not met at the time and in the manner required, then:
a. Liquidated damages at the rate of 10 % shall be applied to the unfulfilled and
escalated offset amount. Enforcement of liquidated damages does not relieve the
company of liability for losses resulting from its failure to meet its contractual
offset commitment. However, in such a case, a right arises for the contractor to
ask for a change in type of its offset commitment.
b. Any contractor who fails to meet the offset commitment may not be allowed to
participate in MND/SSM projects for a specific period of time to be determined
by MND/SSM.
7.2. Liquidated damages to be applied to a contractor who has not fulfilled its offset
commitment shall be collected from its letter of bank guarantee given in respect of
its offset commitment.
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8.

FORCE MAJEURE

8.3. The eligible party shall not be liable for the delays resulting from the below
mentioned Force Majeure. The eligible party shall submit the proof of occurrence
of any events of the specified force majeure events and its effects on the offset
commitment to MND/SSM within 30 days following the commencement of force
majeure. Otherwise, the eligible party shall be held responsible for delays due to
these factors as if the cause is its own fault. MND/SSM has the right to make
necessary investigation about the delay. If MND/SSM agrees that a force majeure
event has occurred, then, MND/SSM shall extend the duration of the offset
program for a reasonable period of time depending upon the circumstances. In such
case, there will not be any liquidated damage to be applied for the extension period.
However, offset amount shall be escalated in accordance with the escalation
formula set forth for the foreign content of the project during this period. If the
realization of the offset program exceeds the period stated in Article 4.5. due to
extension of time, points indicated in Article 4.5. shall be applied.
8.2. Force Majeure means any of following events:
a. Earthquake, flood, epidemics or other natural physical disaster,
b. War or hostilities,
c. Invasion, foreign enemy mobilization,
d. Riot, revolution, civil war, mobilization, commotion,
e. Seizure of power, rebellion, disorder or civil disturbances,
f. Embargo or seizure,
g. Strikes.
8.3. For the eligible party not to be held responsible for the delays resulting from the
causes set forth in Article 8.2., the eligible party has to take all necessary actions
not to be affected by the event of force majeure. In addition, such delays may not
have been caused by the negligent acts or omission of the eligible party or its
personnel during the performance of offset commitment and documents approved
by the competent Turkish authorities concerning this situation have to be submitted
to MND/SSM promptly.
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9.

REPORTING

9.1. With regard to the realization of its offset commitments, the contractor shall
prepare a "quarterly development report" on the realized exports and an "annual
report" concerning all of its offset commitments and submit these to MND/SSM
within 7 days following the beginning of the month.
9.2. The quarterly development reports should include the following information:
•

The amount of export realized in the foreign currency which is used in the
prime contract (If export is made in a currency other than the one used in the
prime contract, the specified amount shall be converted into the currency in the
prime contract by using cross exchange rates of Central Bank of Republic of
Turkey on the date the export was actually made),

•

Name of the country and company to which export was made,

•

Type and amount of the exported goods and services,

•

Amount of local value added,

•

Name, title and addresses of producers of the exported goods and services,

•

A certified copy of custom clearance declaration showing the realized export
value and a statement saying all is made in the framework of offset contract,

•

Other information to be required by MND/SSM.

9.3. The annual reports should contain the following information :
•

Amount of offset realized up to the report period (as of global values by years),

•

Amount of offset realized during report period (such amount shall be given
separately by type of offset realized),

•

Detailed information which shall be required by MND/SSM concerning the
transactions realized in categories other than the export type of offset during
report period,

•

The total amount of offset commitments fulfilled and unable to be fulfilled
along with reasons for the latter as of the end of the reporting period.
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10. CONTROL AND AUTHORITY OF ANNULMENT
10.1. MND SSM is free to use either independent auditing firms or its own personnel to
audit the accounts of the eligible party or its subcontractors with the objective of
checking the realized offset amounts. MND SSM will bear all the expenses of this
process. The auditing process is accepted by the contractor and no statement can be
put into proposals stating the contrary, otherwise Article 5.3. shall be applied.
10.2. In case of double or over crediting of offset amount due to miscalculation, MND
SSM has the right to annul over crediting within the offset program period. In this
case, the disposition shall be notified to the eligible party by an official letter, and if
needed, points mentioned in Article 3.10 shall be applied to the occurrence of
circumstances by giving a reasonable time for realization of the annulled part.
11.

TERMINATION OF THE PRIME CONTRACT

11.1. If termination of the prime contract occurs before the expiration date for reasons
beyond the control of the contractor, then any offset amount realized in excess of
the contractual offset commitment up to that date shall be credited for future offset
commitments of the contractor within the framework of Article 4.9 upon the
contractor's request.
11.2. If the prime contract has been terminated due to a default of the contractor, the
above mentioned procedure in Article 11.1 shall not be applicable.
12.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND APPLICABLE LAW

12.1. Turkish courts are authorized in solving disputes arising from offset agreements
according to international private and procedure Law No 2675.
12.2. Offset agreements shall be construed and governed in accordance with laws of
Republic of Turkey.
13.

CHANGES TO BE MADE IN THE OFFSET GUIDELINES

13.1. MND/SSM, at any time, has the right to amend this offset guideline partially or
completely. Any such change, however, will not be applied to offset agreements all
ready signed.
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Annex-1
TABLE OF SECTOR MULTIPLIERS
I- INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER
SUBJECTS

MULTIPLIERS

1- DEFENCE ELECTRONICS :
o
o
o
o
o
o

Electromechanics (Gyroscope, optronics, sensor, actuator and hardware).......... 4
Optoelectronics..................................................................................................... 4
Robotics................................................................................................................ 4
Laser Technologies (Measurement, guidance and cutting applications) ............. 3
Software (Artificial intelligence, expert systems)................................................ 4
Semiconductor Technologies ............................................................................... 3

2- ELECTRONICS (Other than the above mentioned fields).................................. 3
3- AERONAUTICS :
Composite Structures Manufacturing Technology .............................................. 3
Propellant Production and Development.............................................................. 2
Engineering Design and Development (CAD CAM Sys. FEM, CFD, etc.) ........ 4
Material Manufacturing Techniques (Forging, injection, molding,
welding and adhesive technologies, metal bonding etc.) .................................... 2
o Avionics related Technologies ............................................................................. 4
o C3I (Command, control, communication and information systems) ................... 4
o Establishment of Overhaul, Repair and Maintenance Center .............................. 3
o
o
o
o

4- AUTOMOTIVE :
o Armour Development Technologies .................................................................... 2
o Night Vision Systems........................................................................................... 4
o Vehicle Design, Research and Development Center ........................................... 2
5- MEDICAL APPLIANCES ...................................................................................... 2
6- OTHER ............................................................................................................... TBD
Other investments and technology transfers specified by MND/SSM related to the
above-mentioned sectors.
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Annex-2
II- TRAINING

SUBJECTS

MULTIPLIERS

1- Quality Control......................................................................................................... 5
2- Research and Development ..................................................................................... 5
3- Training for Technical Staff in the Field of Technology Transfer ...................... 5
4- Other.................................................................................................................... TBD
Training specified by MND/SSM other than the above-mentioned fields.
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APPENDIX C. Undersecretariat for Defense Industries Offset
REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
ANKARA

UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION
OF
DIRECTIVE ON OFFSET IMPLEMENTATIONS
IN THE DEFENSE PROCUREMENT TRANSACTIONS

ANKARA
GENERAL STAFF PRINTING HOUSE
2000
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REPUBLIC OF TURKEY
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
ANKARA
12 MAY 2000
REF: MEY. :
SUBJECT
:

6048-146-00/İd.Şb.
Principles of Offset Implementations in the Defense Industry
Procurements.
PRINCIPAL DIRECTIVE

1.

This directive has been prepared with the objective of implementing the offsets as an
essential principle in Turkey which has attained a specific infrastructure and potential in
the defense industry sector and for this purpose to assure that offsets to be received in
connection with the international procurements and joint venture projects reach as high
proportions as possible and are implementable.

2.

A certain infrastructure has been established during the past period by the Ministry of
National Defense in the offset implementations for the defense industry projects and
significant experience and knowledge have been obtained. In the light of the subject
experience and knowledge, the implementation results have been reviewed in
accordance with the contemporary conditions by also taking into consideration that the
competition in the international defense markets is gradually intensifying at the present
and the fact that the producers make attractive offset offers, and these have been
coordinated with all the related institutions and these implementation procedures and
principles have been determined.

3.

All defense industry and procurement projects to be contracted after the competitive
bidding procedures by the Ministry of National Defense and all the files of the invitation
to competitive bidding not yet sent to the bidders will be carried out in accordance with
the principles of this directive.

4.

The coordinating office for the implementations of offsets is the Undersecretariat for
Defense Industries.

5.

The Undersecretariat for Defense Industries is also responsible for the coordination of
the offset implementations with the other State Institutions. The offset obligations
obtained based on previously signed offset agreements will be transformed into an
implementation plan by the Undersecretariat of the Defense Industry within four months
from the date of publication of this directive and will be submitted for the approval of
the Minister of Defense and activities will be carried out according to this plan.
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6.

The conformity of the offset implementations with the R&D matrix requirement
document developed by the Ministry of National Defense will be provided.

7.

All proposals for changes that may arise during the implementation process will be
made to the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries of the Ministry of National Defense
without any restriction of time.

Respectfully submitted.
Signature
Sabahattin Çakmakoğlu
Minister of National Defense
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1.

OBJECTIVE:

1.1.

The objective of this directive is the definition, classification of the offset procedures,
determination of the principles for submitting offers and clarifying the applications
related to the offset implementations that will be realized with the objective of
increasing the production opportunities and capabilities of the industry, led by the
defense industry in Turkey, within the framework of the procurement of goods and
services required by the Turkish Armed Forces and/or other public institutions in the
field of the defense industry, from abroad and/or through domestic production by means
of joint ventures and increasing the existing market shares in the international arena and
providing for the balance of payments.

1.2.

Within the framework of the offset programs carried out by the Ministry of Defense
(MSB) and the Undersecretariat of the Defense Industry (SSM) the basic objectives are:

a.

To export the defense industry products and priority industry products and to provide
foreign currency inflow to Turkey through foreign capital investments (new and/or
extension) and thus provide the return of the foreign currency to the economy of Turkey
to the maximum extent of the foreign currency that will go abroad as a result of the
project costs;

b.

To provide savings on foreign currencies through the creation of new domestic
production capabilities by technology transfer determined within the framework of the
requirements as well as by making use of the increases to be provided for the existing
production;

c.

To provide for the carrying out of the projects efficiently for a long period of time by
creating new fields of work and domestic added value and to provide for the industries
established to become self-sufficient; and

d.

To increase the standards of quality and efficiency levels of the existing industry and the
industries that will be established through technology transfer and exports and thus, to
increase the competitive power of the Turkish economy in the international arena.
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2.

SCOPE:

2.1.

The agreements aimed at the direct and indirect offsets obtained from the companies
which participate in the MSB/SSM public biddings are subject to the principles and
procedures in this directive.

2.2.

The offsets of the projects carried out by the MSB Foreign Procurement Department
Chairmanship within the framework of the Main Procurement Agreements and/or the
procurement agreements which require the obtaining of offsets are under the
responsibility of the MSB Foreign Procurement Department Chairmanship and offsets
of the projects carried out by the SSM are supervised under the responsibility of the
SSM.

2.3.

The SSM is the office for the coordination of all of the offset implementations.
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3.

DEFINITIONS:

3.1.

ABBREVIATIONS:

EU
USA
R&D
DTM
MSB
SSM
SSDF
RFP
TÜBİTAK
TGS
3.2.

: European Union
: United States of America
: Research and Development
: Undersecretariat of Foreign Trade (UFT)
: Ministry of National Defense (MND)
: Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (UDI)
: Defense Industry Support Fund (DISF)
: Request for Proposal (RFP)
: Scientific and Technological Research Institute of Turkey
: Turkish General Staff

THE CONCEPT OF OFFSETS:

The MSB/SSM, with the objective of compensating the deficits that may arise in the
balance of payments of Turkey as a result of the payments to be made in foreign currencies
within the framework of the projects carried out, in accordance with the agreement, the exports
to be made from Turkey of the defense industry and/or priority industry products first of all for
strengthening the infrastructure of the defense industry and other transactions providing foreign
currency inflow directed to the development of existing production or export potential of
Turkey are offset. The transactions specified below are considered to be offsets provided that
prior consent is obtained from the MSB/SSM.
a.
b.

c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

The Domestic Net Added Value realized above the level undertaken within the scope of
the Main Procurement Agreement;
The exports at the system, sub-system, parts, materials and services level of the
productions realized (including those that can be used both for military and civilian
purposes) in the fields directly or closely related to the project on the production lines
(including those produced with the same or similar technologies without regard to the
type or model) which are the subject of the Main Procurement Agreement by the
companies realizing the joint production or by the domestic sub-contractors of them;
The exporting of the Turkish industrial products to new foreign markets or an increase
of exports to the existing foreign markets;
The acquirement, development and export of software technologies in the fields of the
defense industry and/or priority industries;
The investments made for the manufacture of spare parts by the related company
directed at the defense industry and the exporting of the products produced as a result of
these investments;
The R&D activities and/or technological cooperation in the field of the defense industry
(including those that can be used for both military and civilian purposes) directed to
increasing the export potential or domestic production potential;
The new foreign capital investments or the extension of the existing foreign capital
investments in the field of the defense industry;

SSM RESERVES THE RIGHT TO CORRECT TRANSLATION AND INTERPRETATION MISTAKES

106

WARNING! THIS IS AN UNOFFICIAL TRANSLATION

h.

i.
j.
k.

3.3.

The joint investments made by the company related to the foreign companies partially or
wholly owned by them in the foreign countries, established with the objective of
marketing in the foreign markets the products of the manufacturing companies in
Turkey, engaged in activities in sectors in which the technological development and
export of products are supported with priority;
The exporting of goods and services to be realized as the result of new or extension
investments; and
The new or extension foreign capital investments to be realized in the fields of advanced
technologies.
If there are no other ways to do offset, training opportunities both in Turkey and abroad,
proposed and financed by the related company for Turkish citizens working for Turkish
universities and/or other firms operating in the field of defense and approved by the
TGS.
DIRECT OFFSETS:

Direct offsets are limited by the transactions specified below:
a.

b.
c.
d.
3.4.

The exports at the system, sub-system, parts, materials and services level of the
productions realized (including those that can be used both for military and civilian
purposes) in the fields directly or closely related to the project on the production lines
(including those produced with the same or similar technologies without regard to the
type or model) which are the subject of the Main Procurement Agreement by the
companies realizing the joint production or by the domestic sub-contractors of them;
The Domestic Net Added Value realized above the level undertaken within the scope of
the Main Procurement Agreement;
The R&D activities and/or technological cooperation in the field of the defense industry
(including those that can be used for both military and civilian purposes) directed to
increasing the export potential or domestic production potential; and
The exporting of software related to the defense industry and/or providing source codes
in the fields related to the defense industry software.
INDIRECT OFFSETS:

Within the framework of the projects carried out by the MSB/SSM, the realization of the
transactions specified in Article 3.2. and excluded from the direct offsets are considered to be
indirect offsets (inclusive of items stated in the scope of the Main Procurement Agreement and
the RFP).
3.5.

MAIN PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT:

The Main Procurement Agreement is the agreement signed between the company selected and
the MSB/SSM by receiving the approval of the TGS that regulates the general matters related to
the procurement transactions with the objective of the procurement of goods and services from
abroad and/or domestically through joint venture production and related to the defense industry
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required by the Turkish Armed Forces and/or other public institutions.
3.6.

RELATED COMPANY:

a.

The related company in direct procurement is the foreign company with whom the Main
Procurement Agreement is signed.
The related company in joint production is the foreign company specified in the Main
Procurement Agreement.
The related company for manufacturing under license is the company providing the
license.
The foreign company/companies that provide the subject goods and services are the
related company in case the imports of goods and services to be materialized from the
foreign company/companies exceeds 5 million US dollars for each foreign company
with whom the Turkish company has entered into a commitment for cooperation within
the framework of the project that is the subject of the Main Procurement Agreement.

b.
c.
d.

3.7.

THE COMPANY REALIZING THE OFFSETS:

The following companies are considered to be the companies realizing the offsets in the
fulfillment of offset commitments within the framework of the projects carried out by the
MSB/SSM:
a.
b.
3.8.

The company directly related to the project having an offset obligation and/or the
partners of the related company (in this case the partners of the related company are
required to have a minimum of a 10% share); and
The companies proposed by the related company and included in the offset agreement
provided that they are approved by the MSB/SSM.
CREDITING:

Crediting is deducting the offset transaction amounts realized by the company having an offset
obligation from the amount of commitment of the company.
3.9.

ADVANCE CREDITING:

Advance crediting is the realization of one or a few of the transactions specified in Article 3.2.
above, within the framework of the project carried out by the MSB/SSM, provided that the
related company applies to the MSB/SSM under the conditions specified in Articles 4.6. and
4.7. below, and the approval in writing of the petition by the MSB/SSM and the TGS, to be
considered against the offset commitment to be undertaken when the Main Procurement
Agreement is signed with the company in case the related company is awarded the contract at
the competitive bidding stage and in case direct and/or indirect offsets are realized at the
completion of the project by the related company exceeding the amounts committed.
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3.10.

DOMESTIC NET ADDED VALUE:

3.10.1.

The Net Domestic Added Value realized within the framework of the Main
ProcurementAgreement related to joint production is calculated by taking as the
basis the "Domestic Added Value Calculations" article in the Main Procurement
Agreement.

3.10.2.

The Domestic Net Added Value realized within the scope of export type offset
projects or direct procurement projects from abroad, is the difference after
deducting the costs of the imported goods and services both by the company
realizing the production and by other companies which have provided goods and
services to this company in order to be able to realize the subject production
from the export value of the goods and services produced in Turkey and is the
value of the net production realized in Turkey. In the calculation of the import
inputs, the records of the producers can be examined when necessary.

3.10.3.

In case the documents submitted by the company obligated for offsets are not
considered to be sufficient in the determination of the Domestic Net Added
Value, an expert report from the Chamber of Industry or at places where there
are no Chambers of Industry, then an expert report from the Chamber of
Commerce may be requested.

3.11.

JOINT PRODUCTION:

Joint production activities are the production activities to be made for providing increases in the
production capacity and capabilities of the industry in Turkey directed at meeting the
requirements related to the defense industry of the Turkish Armed Forces and/or the other
public institutions of the related company selected to realize the project within the framework of
projects carried out by the MSB/SSM with the related company at the existing and/or the new
facilities to be established in cooperation with the Turkish companies.
3.12.

PRODUCTION UNDER LICENSE:

Productions under license are production activities carried out under license from the foreign
company or companies within the framework of the projects carried out by the MSB/SSM.
3.13.

NATIONAL PRIME CONTRACTOR:

The national prime contractors are company/companies established according to the Law of the
Republic of Turkey that have more than 50% Turkish capital, which is selected to realize the
project and with whom the Main Procurement Agreement has been signed within the
framework of the projects carried out by the MSB/SSM.
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3.14.

FOREIGN COMPANY:

The foreign company is the company selected to realize the project directly with a joint
investment company or selected to realize the project through a prime contracting company to
be selected from Turkey and with whom a Main Procurement Agreement has been signed or
companies whose centers of activity are outside of Turkey and from whom the prime
contracting company selected in Turkey and/or other Turkish companies serving as subcontractors in the project which purchases imported goods and/or services worth over 5 million
US dollars.
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4.

BASIC PRINCIPLES:

The following criteria will be used in the evaluation and crediting of the offsets.
4.1.

The offsets to be provided by the related company should be realized without charge in
order to be accepted.

4.2.

The crediting of investments that will be realized within the framework of the indirect
offset commitment is possible with the condition that the related company will not
transfer its subject investment to third parties for a minimum of a five (5) year period as
of the date of realization of the investment. In case the investment is withdrawn before
the completion of the subject periods or if the company withdraws the investment
without obtaining permission from the MSB/SSM, then offset credit given is canceled
and as of the date of crediting, a penalty is accrued in the foreign currency type in the
offset agreement if such a clause is in the agreement and is collected from the company
along with a 10% simple annual interest rate for the delay.

4.3.

The expenses of the related company or the company realizing the offset within the
framework of its offset activities, such as consulting, personnel expenses,
administrative, etc. expenses, cannot be credited in any manner to its offset
commitment.

4.4.

If the amount of the export type direct offsets directed to the field of the defense industry
realized exceeds the amount of the commitment, then the excess amount can be credited
to the indirect offset commitment within the framework of the same project by
multiplying it with a multiplier of three (3).

4.5.

The export type indirect offset amount realized by the related company in excess of its
commitment related to the exporting of the priority industrial goods and services
determined by the MSB/SSM and the DTM in coordinating with the TGS can be
credited to the unrealized direct offset commitment of the company upon the request of
the related company and on the condition that a minimum of 50% of its export type
direct offset obligations are realized by multiplying it with a multiplier between 1/2 1/3. The subject multipliers are determined by taking into consideration the priority
sectors.

4.6.

The request of the related company for advance crediting directed to the offset
obligations before signing the Main Procurement Agreement can be subject to advance
crediting within the framework of the principles determined in this directive if the
request is approved by the MSB/SSM in coordinating with the TGS. No advance
crediting can be made in case the offset transactions that will form the basis for the
advance crediting of the related company are realized and/or planned to be realized prior
to the date of publication of the RFP related to the project. In other words, the offset
projects proposed by the related company should be new and must be realized in the
period of the project which is the subject of the competitive bidding. The related offset
project period starts from the publication date of the RFP. In case the related company to
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which the RFP was sent realizes the offset transactions that will form the basis for
advance crediting, then the advance credit is canceled in case the Main Procurement
Agreement is not signed with the related company.
4.7.

In case the direct and/or indirect offsets are realized in excess of the committed amount
within the validity period of the offset agreement, then the excess amount can be subject
to advance crediting to the offset commitments to be undertaken by the related company
upon the request of the related company and/or its partners (the subject partners are
required to own at least a 10% share of the company). However, if the request for
crediting for the offset amount to be subject to advance crediting in this manner is not
made within one (1) year as of the date of realization of the offset, then the amount of
the excess offset is not taken into consideration. The advance credited offset amount is
valid for a five (5) year period from the date of the subject petition.

4.8.

In case of the exporting of the products manufactured as a result of the investments that
can be considered to be indirect offsets within the scope of the projects carried out by
the MSB/SSM, then the Domestic Net Added Value created in Turkey for the
manufacturing of those goods are accepted as indirect offsets proportional to the
company shares of the related company and credited accordingly. In case the created
amount of the Domestic Net Added Value is over 51%, then the indirect offset credit
amount is determined by multiplying the total invoice amount by the proportion of
company shares of the related company.

4.9.

Technologies conforming to the EU and USA environmental standards will be given
priority in the activities related to technological cooperation to be realized in the scope
of the offsets.

4.10.

The offset percentage to be committed by the related company within the framework of
the domestic joint production projects that are being carried out by the MSB/SSM and
whose foreign minimum procurement cost is a total of five (5) million US dollars,
cannot be less than 50% of the import cost of the project. At least one half of the direct
offset commitments is required to be realized as the export type direct offsets in
accordance with Article 3.3.a. specified above. However, the export type direct offset
ratio can be increased by the MSB/SSM for providing an increase in exports in the field
of the defense industry and this matter is stated in the related RFP.

4.10.1.

In case the import portion of goods and/or services to be purchased to be realized
from the foreign company with which the Turkish company, which is included
within the framework of the project that is the subject of the Main Procurement
Agreement, has made a cooperation agreement, exceeds five (5) million US
dollars, then the minimum offset ratio to be committed by the foreign company
cannot be less than 50% of the import portion of the subject purchase of goods
and/or services. A minimum of 50% of this ratio must be direct offsets.
However, the direct and indirect offset commitment ratios in cases when the
subject foreign company cannot engage in joint production activities in Turkey
are specified in the RFP.
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4.10.2.

In cases when it is determined that the Domestic Net Added Value ratios
targeted in the scope of the Main Procurement Agreement to be signed within
the framework of the joint production projects could not be reached under the
capabilities of the existing defense industry infrastructure, then the difference in
the Domestic Added Value is compensated by increasing the export type direct
and indirect offsets. This matter is clearly specified in the related RFP.

4.11.

The minimum offset amount to be applied in the direct procurement projects from
abroad in which a domestic joint production is not envisaged is 50% of the project cost.
The direct and indirect offset ratios to be committed by the related company and the
offset methods to be applied are determined by the MSB/SSM by taking into
consideration the existing capabilities of the Turkish industry and these are clearly
specified in the RFP.

4.12.

In case the Domestic Net Added Value ratio for the products that are the subject for
exporting in the export type direct offsets to be realized is a minimum of 51% or more,
then the total invoice value of the goods is credited as direct offsets. In case the
Domestic Net Added Value ratio is less than 51%, then the crediting will be up to the
amount of the Domestic Net Added Value realized. The minimum Domestic Net Added
Value ratio can be reduced to as low as 30% by the MSB/SSM for some products for
which production with advanced technology is required. The related company is
required to obtain the approval of the MSB/SSM for the minimum Domestic Net Added
Value ratio to be applied before the subject export connections are made for being able
to credit the related transactions. Prior to any approval, the MSB/SSM coordinate the
subject with the TGS.

4.13.

In the exporting of goods and/or services to be realized in the scope of the indirect
offsets, if the Domestic Net Added Value ratio of the goods and/or services which are
the subject of exports are a minimum of 51% or more, then the total invoice amounts of
the goods and/or services are credited as indirect offsets. The crediting of the subject
exports can be made by the DTM in case it is approved by the MSB/SSM. In that case,
the principles of crediting related to exports are jointly determined by the MSB/SSM
and the DTM.

4.14.

In the export of main weapons systems, for which the costs for the design and R&D are
met from domestic sources to provide the effectiveness in the international markets of
the Turkish companies engaged in activities in the defense industry field, crediting can
be made by applying a multiplier between 1-2 if approved by the MSB/SSM. A
multiplier of one (1) is applied for exports for other export type direct and indirect
offsets.

4.15. In case the related company provides technological cooperation that will provide the
opportunity for technology transfer and/or R&D to the Turkish companies in the scope of
the offset obligations of the related company, then 50% of the subject offset transactions
obtained without multiplication with a multiplier, is repaid to the SSDF by the company
using the offsets without any interest in US dollars or Euro within five (5) years at the latest
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within the framework of a payment plan acceptable to the MSB/SSM. The MSB/SSM
coordinate the subject with the TGS.
4.16.

In case the related company having the offset obligation establishes a sales connection
within a region to be defined in the offset agreement as in the scope of the sales rights to
third countries in addition to the deliveries specified in the Main Procurement
Agreement signed, then the related company will place orders with the Turkish industry
by taking into account the highest Domestic Net Added Value reached in the scope of
the related project and the existing competitive conditions.

4.17.

The priority sectors and fields of industry are determined every year by the MSB/SSM in
coordination with the DTM, TÜBİTAK and the other related institutions.

4.18.

During the discussions related to the Main Procurement Agreement and/or the
procurement agreements requiring offsets, the potential offset projects committed by the
company will also be discussed and these will be included as a list in the offset
agreement. If new projects are brought up, then the approval of the MSB/SSM will be
obtained. Prior to any approval, the MSB/SSM coordinate the subject with the TGS.

4.19.

The offsets realized within the framework of the MSB/SSM projects cannot be credited
to the account of another company excluding the related company and/or the partners of
the related company (in this case the related company is required to have a minimum of
a 10% share in the subject partnership).

4.20.

The multipliers to be applied for the offset transactions in the offset commitments are
shown in the Appendix.
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5.

SUBMISSION OF PROPOSALS:

5.1.

The company undertaking offset commitments within the framework of the project
carried out by the MSB/SSM, will submit its proposal related to the subject commitment
within the period specified in the RFP sent to them and present it to the MSB/SSM in a
file separate from its proposal related to the project and including the information
specified below.

5.2.

The information to be submitted in the proposal file related to the offset commitment:

a.

The information on the offset experience in the past of the company that will make a
commitment and/or the companies that will realize the offset commitment with the
approval of the MSB/SSM;
The offset amounts committed by years (in the type of foreign currency proposed in the
Main Procurement Agreement and/or procurement agreement requiring the obtainment
of offsets);
The statement to the effect that the application of sanctions specified in Article 8 below
are unconditionally accepted in case the offsets committed are not fulfilled;
The kinds of offsets committed (per the main headings included in Article 3.2.) and
presentation of detailed information as much as possible in the framework of the
concrete offset projects;
The answers provided related to all of the other information requested in the offset
section of the RFP; and
The information related to other subjects that are deemed to be useful by the related
company besides the matters specified above.

b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
5.3.

At the conclusion of the preliminary evaluations to be made on the offset proposal
submitted to the MSB/SSM, if the subject proposal is perceived not to meet the basic
offset criteria included in this directive, then the representatives of the company are
invited and requested to correct their proposals within the framework of the subject
criteria. In case the requested corrections are not made within the specified period, then
the offset proposal of the related company is not taken into consideration in the
evaluations and that company is assumed to have not submitted any proposal on this
subject. All these activities are coordinated with the TGS by the MSB/SSM.

5.4.

One of the validity articles of the Main Procurement Agreement and/or a procurement
agreement requiring obtainment of offsets is the signing of the offset agreement and its
going into effect.
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6.

CREDITING:

6.1.

The following aspects are applied for crediting the subject commitment of the
transactions realized within the framework of the offset obligation of related company.

6.1.1.

a.
b.

The multipliers given in the Appendix are applied in the crediting of the
investment and technological cooperation type of offset obligations. In the
crediting, the following are taken into consideration in proportion to the share of
the related company in the investment:
The amount of the investment made, and
The profits reconverted to investments which are obtained at the conclusion of the
investments made and that are not transferred abroad.

6.1.1.1.

In the investment type offsets, the following information and explanations
should be submitted by the related company to the MSB/SSM: the type of
investment to be made, the period of investment and production, whether or not
the subject goods and services that will be produced will be exported, the share
of the related company within the total investment, information on other real and
juristic persons who will participate in the investment and information related to
the transfer of the profits obtained from the investment. In the scope of Article
3.2.g. and j., in crediting the investment type offsets, the amounts obtained by
multiplying the multipliers specified in the Appendix by the investment
amounts, which are taken as the basis in crediting, are used. It is necessary to
apply to the MSB/SSM and to get their approval before obtaining the foreign
capital investment permission from the Undersecretariat of the Treasury in order
to consider the subject investments as offsets. All these activities are coordinated
with the TGS by the MSB/SSM.

6.1.1.2.

In the investment type offsets to be credited in the scope of the project, an export
guarantee can be requested at a certain percentage of the total investment by
taking into account the export potential of the investment that will be made. In
case a request is made for an export guarantee, then the investment amount is
temporarily credited after the completion of the investment by applying the
multiplier specified in the Appendix. The amount of investment temporarily
credited is subject to final crediting in proportion to the amount of exports as the
desired exports are realized.

6.1.2.

If the investments are realized in regions with development priority which
are published every year in the Official Gazette, then the multipliers can
be
increased up to eight (8) by taking into consideration the features and
the size of the investment and provided that the multipliers specified in the
Appendix are approved by the MSB/SSM.

6.1.3.

The Domestic Net Added Value realized above the committed amount in the
Main Procurement Agreement in the scope of Article 3.2.a. is credited as a direct
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offset with the use of a multiplier of one (1). Upon the request of the related
company, the excess Domestic Net Added Value that is requested to be credited
as an indirect offset is credited with the use of a multiplier of two (2). The
Domestic Net Added Value realized by the Turkish companies with the support
of the related company within the framework of the direct procurement projects
from abroad for which joint production is not envisaged are credited according
to the principles specified in this article.
6.1.4.

In the crediting of the export type offsets within the framework of Article 3.2.b.
c., d., e. and i., Articles 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14 are taken as the basis for the exports
materialized. The company is required to clearly specify the features of the
goods and services to be exported in the export type offset commitment.

6.1.5.

The multipliers shown in the Appendix are used as the basis in crediting for the
offset commitments in the scope of Article 3.2.f. However, it is required that the
invoices and/or other acceptable documents for the expenses made by the related
company for technological cooperation and/or R&D are submitted by the
company.

6.1.6.

The investments specified in Article 3.2.h. are credited with a multiplier of two
(2).

6.2.

In the crediting of offsets in the scope of technological cooperation, the real
market value and/or equivalent value of the subject technology is taken as the
basis. This value is specified by the MSB/SSM and/or by organizations deemed
appropriate by the MSB/SSM. In order for the offsets within the scope of
technological cooperation to be subject to crediting, the offsets should be made
free of charge and the organization which will receive the technology should
accept entering into an obligation towards the MSB/SSM due to the gains to be
obtained as the result of the subject technological cooperation. All these
activities are coordinated with the TGS by the MSB/SSM.
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7.

ESCALATION:

7.1.

The offset committed is escalated within the framework of an escalation formula to be
applied for the goods and services to be imported and included in the Main Procurement
Agreement at the beginning of every program year or according to the escalation
analysis to be made by the MSB/SSM in coordinating with the TGS, it will be escalated
at a fixed rate of escalation determined once on the date the project goes into effect.

7.2.

If the Main Procurement Agreement is signed with fixed prices, no escalation is applied
to the offset commitments if the related offset obligation realization period of the related
offset obligation is the same as the project implementation period. In case the offset
realization period is longer than the project implementation period, then escalation is
applied as specified in Article 7.1. above to the remaining offset commitments as of the
beginning of the first program years after the completion of the project.

7.3.

In case the offset commitments which are escalated up until the beginning of the related
program year are not realized within the program year to which they belong, then the
subject commitment amounts not realized are escalated for one more year and added to
the escalated commitment amount for the succeeding program year.
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8.

BANK LETTER OF GUARANTEE AND PENALTY SANCTIONS:

8.1.

An irrevocable bank letter of guarantee issued by an internationally reputable foreign
bank and/or a Turkish bank up to the total potential delay penalty specified in Article
10.4 below and a 10% potential penalty amount to be calculated on the estimated
escalated cumulative total commitment amount is taken from the related company which
has undertaken the offset commitment by taking into consideration the probability that
the offset commitments could not be fulfilled within the specified period and under the
required conditions. Regarding this process, the MSB/SSM notifies the TGS with a
written report. The format of the subject bank letter of guarantee and when it will be
obtained is specified in the related RFP.

8.2.

In case the offsets are not fulfilled within the envisaged period and conditions:

a.

A pecuniary penalty at the rate of 10% of the escalated cumulative offset amount of the
commitment not fulfilled is applied. The pecuniary penalty to be applied to the related
company which could not fulfill its obligation is transferred to the SSDF by the related
company upon the request of the MSB/SSM. In case the related company does not pay
the subject penalty, then this amount is collected from an irrevocable bank letter of
guarantee obtained as a provision for the potential penalty calculated in the scope of the
offset commitment specified in the offset agreement of the company and/or from
payments to be made, if any, to the related company by the MSB/SSM within the scope
of the Main Procurement Agreement.

b.

The application of the pecuniary penalty does not release the company from the
responsibility of fulfilling the offset commitment. If the related company does not fulfill
the offset to which it is committed, then a joint committee to be formed by the
representatives of the MSB/SSM and the related company within 90 days after the
conclusion of the implementation period specified in the offset agreement will attempt
to obtain an applicable agreement by starting discussions within the framework of the
principles of good will on the subject of the portion not realized and when and in what
manner it will be realized. In case an agreement cannot be reached or if the offset
commitment is not materialized in spite of an agreement, then the related company is
prohibited by the MSB/SSM from participating in the MSB/SSM projects. The
MSB/SSM notifies the TGS regarding this case with a written report.

c.

Escalation is applied according to Article 7 above in the calculations of penalties. The
maximum amount of penalty to be paid within the scope of the offset agreement by the
related company is up to 10% of the escalated total offset commitments. The offset
commitment which is not fulfilled on time and that is subject to penalty is transferred to
the succeeding period with its escalated form after the application of the penalty and the
obligation of the related company continues based on the determined escalated
cumulative commitment amount. In case escalated cumulative offset commitment is not
fulfilled in the program period to which it belongs, then a penalty is applied. However, a
new penalty is not applied in the subsequent program period for the offset commitments
which were subject to the penalty application in a previous program period.
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9.

FORCE MAJEURE CONDITIONS:

9.1.

The company which realizes its offset commitments will not be responsible for the
delays arising from the force majeure conditions specified below. The company will
submit the required evidence to the MSB/SSM within a maximum of thirty (30) days
following the date of occurrence of the subject force majeure condition showing the
effect of this on the offset commitment if any one of these force majeure conditions
occurs. Otherwise, the related company which has an offset obligation will be
responsible for the delays arising as a result of this as if it was its own fault. The
MSB/SSM is authorized to make the necessary investigations on the subject of delays.
In case the MSB/SSM accepts the force majeure condition as valid, then the realization
period of the offsets will be extended for a reasonable period by the MSB/SSM
according to the circumstances. In such a case no delay penalty will be applied.
However, the offset amount will be escalated in accordance with the escalation method
to which the import portion of the project is subject within this period. All these
activities are reported to the TGS by the MSB/SSM.

9.2.

The force majeure conditions include the following:

-

Natural disasters;
Declared wars;
Occupation, enemy operations;
Rebellion, revolution, civil war, mobilization, uprising;
Takeover of government, revolt, civil turmoil or peoples' movements;
Embargo or confiscation; and
Branchwide strikes.

9.3.

In order for the related company having an offset obligation not to be held responsible
for delays arising from the causes enumerated in Article 9.2., and for the subject force
majeure condition not to negatively affect the fulfillment of the commitment, the
company should have made all the necessary efforts, the company should not have
neglect or fault in the delay of the realization of the offset commitment and the company
is required to submit on time the documents certified by the authorized Turkish officials
attesting this condition to the MSB/SSM.

9.4.

A new regulation can be prepared on matters related to the force majeure conditions in
accordance with the Main Procurement Agreement and/or the procurement agreement
necessitating obtainment of offsets provided that it is approved by the MSB/SSM.
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10.

REPORTING:

10.1.

The related company prepares and submits to the MSB/SSM a Six Month Development
Report for the realized export type offsets once every six months after the offset
agreement goes into effect in connection with the status of realization of the offsets
undertaken and an Annual Report for all of its offset commitments within sixty (60)
days following the termination of the subject reporting period.

10.2.

The following information will be included in the Six Month Development Report:

-

The export amount realized in foreign currency included in the offset agreement (if the
export is made in a foreign currency other than the foreign currency specified in the
offset agreement, then the cost of the product exported is converted into the type of
foreign currency included in the offset agreement by using the Republic of Turkey
Central Bank Cross Exchange Rates);
The name of the country and company to which the export was made;
The type and amount of the goods exported;
The calculation of the Domestic Net Added Value;
The list of the import inputs included in the exported goods (type and cost);
The list of the domestic inputs included in the exported goods (type and cost);
The name, title and address of the producer of the goods exported;
A copy of the invoice prepared for goods exported;
A certified copy of the Customs Export Declaration recording the fact that the export
was realized and that it was done within the framework of the offset agreement;
A copy of the approval letter previously given in writing for the related offset activity by
the MSB/SSM;
The foreign currency purchase receipt for the export;
The bank statement documenting that the cost of the goods were paid; and
Other information and documents required by the MSB/SSM.

-

The MSB/SSM can also request documents certified by a Certified Financial Consultant
including the calculations of the Domestic Net Added Value and documents proving that the
related exports were made along with the documents specified above in cases where the
MSB/SSM deems it necessary.
10.3.

In the Annual Report, information related to the following matters will be included in
addition to the information and documents included in Article 10.2.:

-

The amounts and types of the offsets realized prior to the reporting period (by years and
in grand totals);
The amounts and types of the offsets realized in the reporting period (these amounts will
be provided separately according to the types of offsets realized);
The detailed information related to offset transactions realized in categories other than
the export type offsets within the reporting period; and
The amount of offset commitments that were required to be fulfilled but could not be
fulfilled as of the end of the reporting period and the reasons for not being fulfilled;

-
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10.4.

In case the Six Month Development and Annual Reports are not submitted to the
MSB/SSM within the sixty (60) day period specified in Article 10.1. above, then a delay
penalty is applied for each reporting period in the amounts specified in the related RFP.
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11.

AUTHORITY FOR CONTROL AND CANCELLATION:

11.1.

The MSB/SSM is authorized to have its own personnel or an independent auditing
organization control accounts of the company realizing the commitment or its subcontractors related to the offset activities aimed at determining to what extent the offsets
have been realized.

11.2.

In case crediting exceeding the real amount has been made by repeated crediting of the
offset amount or by a calculation error, the MSB/SSM has the right to cancel the excess
crediting made as of the date of completion of the realization period of the offset
commitments up to a one (1) year period. In this case, the situation is notified in writing
to the company realizing the offset and if necessary a reasonable period of time is
recognized for the fulfillment of the commitment related to the canceled portion. All
these activities are reported to the TGS by the MSB/SSM.
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12.

CANCELLATION OF THE PROCUREMENT AGREEMENT:

12.1.

In case the Main Procurement Agreement and/or the procurement agreement
necessitating the obtainment of offsets is partially or completely canceled before its
period of termination or terminated in another manner due to reasons beyond the control
of the related company, then the offset obligation of the related company is revised
proportionally. If the offset amounts realized before this date exceed the proportional
cost of the fulfilled portion of the Main Procurement Agreement related to the project
and/or the other procurement agreement, then the excess amount can be applied to the
offset commitments to be assumed in the future by the related company within the
framework of Article 4.7 above upon the request of the company realizing the offsets. In
case the proportional cost is not exceeded, then transactions are made according to the
decrees of the existing offset agreement. All the above mentioned points are coordinated
with the TGS bt the MSB/SSM.

12.2.

If the Main Procurement Agreement and/or the procurement agreement necessitating the
obtainment of offsets are terminated as the result of the fault of the related company,
then the application specified in Article 4.7. above is not made for the excess offsets
realized within the period of implementation. Penalties are applied for incompletely
realized offsets. This case is reported to the TGS by the MSB/SSM.
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13.

RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES

13.1.

The offset agreements will be signed and applied according to the Turkish laws.

13.2.

The methods to be applied in the resolution of disputes that may arise within the scope
of the offset agreements are specified in the related RFP.

13.3.

All of the activities of the related company, that has the offset obligation, which enters
into cooperation with the Turkish industrial companies and other related organizations
within the scope of the offset agreements will be realized according to the Turkish laws
and Article 13.2. above will be applied in the resolution of the disputes. This matter will
be included in the agreements that will form the basis of the implementations.
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14.

CHANGES TO BE MADE IN THE DIRECTIVE

14.1.

The MSB/SSM can change this directive partially or completely at any time. The
principles of application of the changes made to the offset commitments previously
contracted are determined separately by the MSB/SSM.

14.2.

The principles of applications of the articles of this directive to the offset agreements
signed before the publication date of this directive are determined separately by the
MSB/SSM upon the request of the related company.
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APPENDIX
TABLE OF MULTIPLIERS
MULTIPLIER

I. INVESTMENT
SUBJECTS
1.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY INVESTMENTS ........................................................................3

2.

INDUSTRIAL INVESTMENTS CONNECTED TO ADVANCED TECHNOLOGIES
OUTSIDE OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY FIELD........................................................2

3.

THE USE OF THE PROFITS OBTAINED FROM THE INVESTMENTS MADE AS
OFFSETS FOR THE CAPITAL INCREASES .................................................................1

In case the industrial investments are made in the regions with development priority, then the
multipliers to be applied can be increased up to 8 according to the evaluations made by the
MSB/SSM by taking into consideration the features and size of the investment to be made.
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APPENDIX
II.

TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION

MULTIPLIER

SUBJECTS
1.

SENSOR TECHNOLOGY
Active Phase Array Radars .................................................................................................6
Synthetic Aperture Radars ..................................................................................................6
Neural Circuits ....................................................................................................................6
RFPer Optic Sensors ...........................................................................................................6
Electro Optic Sensors..........................................................................................................5
Sensor Fusion ......................................................................................................................5

2.

WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY
Intelligent Ammunition.......................................................................................................5
Tandem Warhead Ammunition ..........................................................................................6
Lasers...................................................................................................................................5
Ramjet Technique ...............................................................................................................6
Laser Beam Riding Guidance .............................................................................................6
Imaged Monitor Guidance ..................................................................................................6
Infrared Guidance................................................................................................................6
Atmospheric and Nonatmospheric Missiles.......................................................................5
Hypersonic Missiles ............................................................................................................5

3.

ARMORED VEHICLE PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY
Composite Armor................................................................................................................5
NBC Protection ...................................................................................................................5
Active/Reactive Armor .......................................................................................................5

4.

C3 AND ELECTRONIC WARFARE
The multiplier is determined between 4-6 as a result of the evaluations to be made by the
MSB/SSM according to the features and importance of the proposed technology.

5.

SPACE AND AVIATION
Composite Body Structures ................................................................................................5
Low Traceability .................................................................................................................5
Unmanned Aircraft..............................................................................................................5
Avionic Systems..................................................................................................................5

6.

DATA PROCESSING
The multiplier is determined between 3-6 as a result of the evaluations to be made by the
MSB/SSM according to the features and importance of the proposed technology.
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7.

MEDICAL FIELD
The multiplier is determined between 3-5 as a result of the evaluations to be made by the
MSB/SSM according to the features and importance of the proposed technology.

8.

OTHER
Technological cooperation in other fields deemed to be suitable by the MSB/SSM other
than the main technology fields specified above. The multiplier to be applied within this
scope is determined between 3-6.

III.

R&D

R&D ACTIVITIES
The multiplier is applied between 5-8 provided that it is deemed to be suitable by the
MSB/SSM and according to the features and importance of the proposed R&D activity.

IV.

TRAINING

1. HIGHER EDUCATION AT ABROAD
The multiplier is applied between 5-8 provided that it is deemed to be suitable by the
MSB/SSM and according to the features and importance of the proposed education.
2. TRAINING ON THE JOB
The multiplier is applied between 3-5 provided that it is deemed to be suitable by the
MSB/SSM and according to the features and importance of the proposed training.
3. OTHER TRAINING ACTIVITIES
Training activities other than the above mentioned fields, the multiplier is applied between 3-5
provided that it is deemed to be suitable by the MSB/SSM and according to the features and
importance of the proposed training.
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APPENDIX D. Draft Offset Agreement
UNDERSECRETARIAT FOR DEFENCE INDUSTRIES
OFFSET AGREEMENT
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Purpose
Scope
Definitions
Offset Liability
Crediting
Pre-crediting
Bank Guaranty
Penalties
Force Majeure
Reporting and Meetings
Control and Authority of Annulment
Termination of PRIME CONTRACT
Dispute Resolution and Applicable Law
Changes to be made in the Guidelines
Effectiveness
Language
Notices

Preamble
This Agreement is made at the date of . by and between Undersecretariat for
Defence Industries (Savunma Sanayii Müsteşarlığı; ''SSM''), and the
CONTRACTOR, (together referred to as the "Parties").
Whereas SSM has entered into a contract with CONTRACTOR at the date of ....... for
the supply of ...................... (the "PRIME CONTRACT") under which SSM requires
the CONTRACTOR, to arrange for direct and indirect Offset as defined herein,
Whereas the CONTRACTOR carry out the said direct and indirect Offset obligations
("direct and indirect Offset obligations") and the CONTRACTOR has agreed to take
full responsibility for the same,
Whereas SSM agrees that the CONTRACTOR shall carry out the direct and indirect
Offset obligations as set forth in this Agreement which includes the procedures and
guidelines for the approval and crediting of direct and indirect Offset and provide for
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penalties in the event that the direct and indirect Offset obligations hereunder are not
met.
Now therefore the Parties hereto have agreed as follows:
Article 1. Purpose
This Offset Agreement has been entered into to implement the general guidelines and
objectives set forth in SSM Publication No. 5, Undersecretariat for Defence Industries
''OFFSET GUIDELINES'' dated 1991(hereinafter ''Offset Guidelines''), as amended
from time to time, as well as the specific obligations set forth herein. This agreement
shall be subject to such guidelines and, notwithstanding anything in this agreement to
the contrary, SSM shall at all times have the right to amend this agreement so as to
implement the substantive requirements of any future published amendments to such
offset guidelines.
Article 2. Scope:
The obligations set forth herein are, except where specified, obligations of
CONTRACTOR to SSM independent of the Prime Contract and are fully enforceable
by SSM in accordance with the terms hereof.
Article 3. Definitions:
3.1. Abbreviations:
SSM: Undersecretariat for Defence Industries
R & D: Research and Development
3.2. Offset concept:
Defence industry related exports and any other kinds of foreign currency inflows
secured pursuant to Agreement in order to compensate for the foreign currency
shortfall occurring as a result of foreign currency payments in the framework of SSM
projects are treated as "Offset".
The following items, apart from the project related activities stated in the PRIME
CONTRACT, are accepted as Offset:
a. New or expanded foreign capital investments;
b. License, know-how and Technology Transfers;
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c. Training opportunities both in Turkey and abroad, proposed and financed by the
CONTRACTOR for Turkish citizens and approved by SSM.
d. Research and Development work opportunities and funds created by the
CONTRACTOR for Turkish universities and/or other Turkish research
institutions,
e. Investment by the CONTRACTOR in industrial companies to establish and
operate R & D facilities particularly to develop prototypes,
f. Capital contributions by the CONTRACTOR to foreign companies established
and/or participated in by Turkish manufacturing companies whose technological
development and exports are granted priority by the Turkish Government and
which companies are established for the purpose of marketing their products in
international markets; provided, however, that SSM's prior approval is obtained
for any such capital contribution;
g. Export of Turkish defence or related industrial goods and services to Defence
Industries in CONTRACTOR's country via foreign companies with Turkish
capital share participation by Turkish defence and/or related industries;
h. Exports to be realized by new or expanded investments and any other alternative
long-term export possibilities created by the CONTRACTOR,
i. Turkish defence and related industries exports, government to government sales
and sale of machinery, equipment and spare parts within the framework of SSM
projects to foreign ministries of defence and international defence institutions,
j. Transportation of goods with Turkish flag carriers including transportation
insurance with Turkish insurers on net value added basis, transportation and
freight costs.
3.3. Direct Offset:
Direct Offsets are goods and services exported by the CONTRACTOR either to the
country of CONTRACTOR or to third countries in Turkish Value Added basis. The
goods and services to be exported may include the systems, subsystems, components,
parts, materials and services. These exports should be directly or indirectly related
with the project, it is not necessary to be the same type or model provided unless
similar technology is used in their production.
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3.4. Indirect Offset:
Transactions other than the ones defined as direct Offset and set forth in Article 3.2.
are treated as indirect Offsets in the framework of SSM projects.
3.5. Prime Contract:
PRIME CONTRACT is the document signed between SSM and CONTRACTOR in
order to set forth the terms and conditions of procuring......
3.6. Contractor:
COMPANY is the contractor for this Offset Agreement.
3.7. Eligible Party:
The following Parties are eligible to fulfill the Offset commitments of SSM projects;
a. Companies at least 50 % of the voting shares of which are owned by
CONTRACTOR or their affiliates owned by these companies (i.e., companies at
least 50 % of the voting shares of which are owned by them);
b. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the 50 % voting capital share ownership referred
to in a. above may not be required with respect to:
1) Publicly owned companies the shares of which are listed on a stock exchange
and with respect to which CONTRACTOR can demonstrate (to SSM's
satisfaction) that CONTRACTOR effectively controls the decision making
process, and
2) Turkish companies producing the eligible offset items set forth in Article 3.2
which are defence industry related companies.
3) Upon the approval of SSM, non-(country of the CONTRACTOR) companies
partially owned by CONTRACTOR.
c. Companies suggested by CONTRACTOR and approved by SSM.
3.8. Crediting:
''Crediting'' shall mean the process of deducting the value of any Offset transactions
realized by an eligible party from its Offset commitment.
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3.9. Pre-crediting:
''Pre-crediting'' shall mean the realization, subject to the prior written consent of SSM,
of offset transactions stated in Article 3.2. by an eligible party but to be credited to the
account of the CONTRACTOR in cases in which the PRIME CONTRACT is
awarded to the CONTRACTOR.
3.10. Turkish Value Added:
3.10.1. ''Turkish Value Added'' shall mean the total value of an offset transaction less
each of:
a. The value of all materials and services imported from outside of Turkey or paid
for in a currency other than Turkish Lira;
b. All profits or distributions attributable to the Prime Contract transferred outside of
Turkey.
For the calculation of Turkish Value Added, the books of the eligible party and or its
subcontractors may be audited at any time by SSM. At SSM's request,
CONTRACTOR shall submit documentation satisfactory to SSM to enable SSM to
verify CONTRACTOR's calculation of Turkish Value Added.
3.11. Co-production:
''Co-production'' shall mean production activities of the CONTRACTOR with
Turkish companies in facilities existing and/or to be established in Turkey and which
production activities increase the production opportunities and capabilities of Turkish
industry.
3.12. Libor:
"Libor" shall mean the London Interbank Offering Rate per annum quoted for the
corresponding period in the London Interbank Market of United States Dollars for
immediately available funds.
Article 4. Offset Liability
4.1. Direct Offset Commitment:
4.1.1. The base amount of direct offset to be effected under the terms and conditions set
forth in this agreement shall be ...........................................(US $.............) ( The
''Direct Offset Commitment'') in Turkish Value Added basis.

134

4.1.2. The direct offset commitment, which will be increased by a factor equal to
(LIBOR + 2%.), shall be realized within a period of ..... (...) years from the
effective date of this agreement (such ..... year period hereinafter referred to as the
''Effectivity Period'').
4.1.3. During the Effectivity Period CONTRACTOR shall realize the offset
commitment as set forth below, however, none of the projects to be realized in
Turkey under the Offset Agreement will be the same as the defence projects
which are under evaluation or being implemented by Turkish General Staff,
Turkish Army, Turkish Navy, Turkish Air Force, Ministry of National Defence
and SSM. In other words, proposals made by CONTRACTOR should not result
in interference with the current defence tenders in Turkey.
Period
(Years)

Commitment
($ Value)

1.
2.
3.
''
''
TOTAL
4.1.4. If CONTRACTOR fails to realize its direct offset commitment for a particular
year as set forth above, the unfulfilled portion of such commitment shall be added
to the next year's direct offset commitment and increased by a factor equal to
(LIBOR + 2%). Nevertheless, CONTRACTOR is free to realize direct offset
commitments in advance of the schedule set forth above, and (subject to Article 6
below) any direct offsets realized in excess of the applicable direct offset target
for the year concerned shall be credited to the direct offset commitment for the
following period(s).
4.1.5. If for any reason (except, with respect to Prime Contract price reduction, for
reasons attributable to CONTRACTOR's default under the Prime Contract), the
total purchase price to be paid to CONTRACTOR under the Prime Contract shall
be increased or reduced, as the case might be, such that CONTRACTOR's direct
offset commitments equal...........................percent (.......%) of the revised Prime
Contract purchase price.

135

4.2. Indirect Offset Commitment:
4.2.1. The base amount of direct offset to be effected under the terms and conditions set
forth in this agreement shall be ...............................................(US $ ...................)
(The ''Indirect Offset Commitment'') in Turkish Value Added basis for export
type of indirect offsets.
4.2.2. The Indirect Offset Commitment, which will be increased by a factor equal to
(LIBOR + 2%.) shall be realized within a period of ..... (....) years from the
effective date of this agreement (such ... year period hereinafter referred to as the
''Effectivity Period'').
4.2.3. During the Effectivity Period CONTRACTOR shall realize the Indirect Offset
Commitment as set forth below, however, none of the projects to be realized in
Turkey under the Offset Agreement will be the same as the defence projects
which are under evaluation or being implemented by Turkish General Staff,
Turkish Army, Turkish Navy, Turkish Air Force, Ministry of National Defence
and SSM. In other words, proposals made by CONTRACTOR should not result in
interference with the current tenders in Turkey.
Period
Commitment
(Years) ($ Value)
1.
2.
3.
''
''
TOTAL
4.2.4. If CONTRACTOR fails to realize its indirect offset commitment for a particular
year as set forth above, the unfulfilled portion of such commitment shall be added
to the next year's indirect offset commitment and increased by a factor equal to
LIBOR + 2%. Notwithstanding the schedule of realization set forth in Section
4.2.3 above, CONTRACTOR is free to realize indirect offset commitments in
advance of the schedule set forth above, and (subject to Article 6 below) any
indirect offsets realized in excess of the applicable indirect offset target for the
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year concerned shall be credited to the offset commitment for the following
period(s).
4.2.5. If for any reason (except, with respect to the Prime Contract price reduction, for
reasons attributable to CONTRACTOR's default under the Prime Contract), the
total purchase price to be paid to CONTRACTOR under the Prime Contract shall
be increased or reduced, the dollar value of CONTRACTOR's indirect offset
commitment shall be proportionately increased or reduced, as the case might be,
such that CONTRACTOR's indirect offset commitment
equals......................................percent (........%) of the revised Prime Contract
purchase price.
Article 5. Crediting
5.1.

Offset activities shall be credited against CONTRACTOR’s offset commitments
pursuant to the following procedures:

5.1.1. The multipliers set forth in Annex- 1 of the SSM publication "Offset Guidelines"
shall be applied in crediting investment and Technology Transfer offsets (as
described in Article 3.2. (a) and (b). The applicable multipliers shall be those set
forth in the then most recently published and effective ''Offset Guidelines'' and
shall be applied to CONTRACTOR's portion of:
a. The total investment amount (less incentives given by the Republic of
Turkey); and
b. That portion of profits obtained from the investment which is kept in Turkey
and utilized for the financing of new investments.
The CONTRACTOR shall submit the following information to SSM with respect
to investment offsets:
a. type of investment,
b. period of investment and production,
c. whether the investment will involve exportation of goods or services from
Turkey,
d. share of CONTRACTOR in the total investment amount,
e. identities of and all required information on other partners or participants in
the investment, and
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f. all required information on repatriation of profits realized from the
investment,
In crediting investment offsets, the amount obtained by applying the multipliers
set forth in Annex- 1 of "Offset Guidelines" to the actual amount of the
investment shall be taken into consideration.
If any such investment is made in the first priority regions announced in the
Official Gazette of the Republic of Turkey, then 2.5 (two and half) will be added
to those multipliers set forth in Annex- 1 of "Offset Guidelines"; if any such
investment is made in the second priority regions, then 2.0 (two) shall be added to
the multipliers set forth in Annex- 1 of "Offset Guidelines".
Investments described in Article 3.2.(f), shall be evaluated on a case by case basis
and will be credited as approved by SSM.
5.1.2. With respect to offsets described in Article 3.2. (c),(d),(e) the multipliers stated in
Annex-2 of "Offset Guidelines" shall be applied, subject to SSM's evaluation and
approval of all related training invoices submitted by CONTRACTOR.
5.1.3. Offsets described in Article 3.2. (g),(h),(i) (Exports) shall be credited on the basis
of Turkish Value Added. CONTRACTOR shall describe in detail the type of
goods and services and the industrial facilities in which the goods are produced.
5.1.4. No multiplier shall be applied to offsets described in Article 3.2. (j).
5.2.

In crediting offsets realized through technology, license and know-how transfers
the actual market value and/or comparable value of the technology transferred
shall be used in determining the amount to be credited. This value shall be
determined by SSM. Technology, license and know-how transfers should be
given free of charge and the product should be exported from Turkey in order to
be credited as offset. In addition, the Turkish recipient of the technology shall
agree to share with SSM (in a manner to be mutually agreed) the benefits of such
Technology Transfer.

5.3.

Investment type of offsets shall be credited provided that CONTRACTOR's
equity in the investment shall not be transferred to any other party for a minimum
of 10 years following the investment.

5.4.

Transportation costs of using Turkish flag carriers and insurance cost if insurance
is through Turkish insurance institutions shall be credited as offset of the
CONTRACTOR subject to SSM's evaluation of the related shipping and
insurance documents.
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5.5.

Expenses of the CONTRACTOR or an eligible party related to personnel and
other administrative activities, overhead and similar expenses related to the offset
programs shall not be credited against CONTRACTOR's offset commitment.

5.6.

In the event that the total value of direct Offset finally achieved would exceed the
total value of the direct Offset commitment, the excess value may be credited to
the CONTRACTOR’s account upon its request for the purpose of fulfilling its
indirect Offset commitment related to the same project.

5.7.

Offset activities to be credited to the account of the CONTRACTOR for its
commitment should be realized after the effectiveness of the Offset Agreement.

5.8.

Exports made in currencies other than US $ shall be converted into US $ at the
official cross rates of the Central Bank of Republic of Turkey at the date of the
customs export declaration forms.

5.9.

Offsets realized under this agreement may not be credited to any company other
than the CONTRACTOR.

Article 6 Pre-crediting
6.1.

Offset proposals of CONTRACTOR made before signing of this agreement may
be pre-credited in accordance with the principles set forth in "Offset Guidelines"
booklet.

6.2.

In the event the total value of offsets finally realized exceeds the total value of the
offset commitments, the excess value shall be pre-credited to the
CONTRACTOR's account, upon its request, for the purpose of fulfilling its future
offset requirements. However, any request for pre-crediting should be made
within (six) 6 months after the excess value has been calculated and any such precredits should be applied against offset commitments within (five) 5 years
following the pre-crediting. If CONTRACTOR fails to comply with the time
periods set forth in the preceding sentence, CONTRACTOR will not be eligible to
obtain or utilize, as the case might be, any such pre-credits.

Article 7. Bank Guaranty
7.1.

CONTRACTOR should give a Bank Guaranty as given in Attachment-A in order
for this agreement to become effective. This Bank Guaranty should be in the form
of a Letter of Guaranty (L/C) obtained from a reputable and trusted bank in the
amount of .............................million US Dollars (US$ ...........................) for the
coverage of the potential total compounded penalty value of its commitment
stated in Article 4.
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7.2.

The purpose of the Letter of Guaranty is to assure SSM of payment by
CONTRACTOR of any penalties assessed against CONTRACTOR under this
Offset Agreement. Before SSM may draw against the Letter of Guaranty, SSM
shall notify CONTRACTOR of the amount of penalty due and the reason the
penalty is due.If CONTRACTOR does not pay the penalty within 30 days after
the notice is given, SSM may draw against the L/C.

7.3.

The L/C shall provide that in order to draw against the L/C, SSM shall provide the
issuing bank with (i) a copy of the notice given to CONTRACTOR under section
7.2 and (ii) a certification of the amount, if any, of the penalty that
CONTRACTOR has not paid.

Article 8. Penalties
8.1.

If Offset commitments are not met at the time and in the manner required, then:
a. A penalty at the rate of 10% shall be applied to the unfulfilled and escalated
offset amount. Enforcement of penalty does not relieve the company of
liability for losses resulting from its failure to meet its contractual offset
commitment.
b. Any CONTRACTOR who fails to realize the offset commitment shall be
prohibited from participating in any additional SSM projects for a specific
period of time to be determined by SSM.

8.2.

CONTRACTOR shall pay all such penalties to SSM no later than 30 (thirty) days
after SSM's written demand, which demand shall provide a justification for the
assessment of such penalty. In the event CONTRACTOR does not so pay any
such penalty within 30 days, SSM shall have the right to (i) draw down such
penalty from the Bank Guaranty (Article 7) and/or (ii) withhold any other
amounts payable by SSM. Moreover, and without limiting the foregoing, any such
unrealized commitment shall be added to the applicable commitment of the
succeeding year and escalated as described in Article 4.

8.3.

The unfulfilled portion of the offset commitment of any year shall be transferred
to and escalated with the offset commitment of the next succeeding year in
accordance with the procedures set forth in Article 4.1.2 or 4.2.2.

8.4.

For each year set forth in Article 4 above, CONTRACTOR shall pay to SSM the
penalty assessed pursuant to Section 8.2 on the then unrealized portion of all
commitments outstanding at the end of such year.
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8.5.

In the event that any portion of the commitments remain unrealized at the end of
the Effectivity Period, CONTRACTOR shall pay to SSM all penalties assessable
on such unrealized commitments and shall remain responsible to realize its offset
obligations; provided, however, that CONTRACTOR shall not be asked for
penalty for succeeding years beyond the Effectivity Period.

Article 9. Force Majeure
9.1.

The CONTRACTOR shall not be liable for the delays resulting from any event of
Force Majeure set forth in Section 9.2. below, provided that (i) such event of
Force Majeure directly and materially prevented the CONTRACTOR from
performing its obligations hereunder. (ii) the affected party took all reasonable
precautions, due care of reasonable alternative measures in order to avoid the
effect of such event of Force Majeure, (iii) the affected party took all reasonable
measures to mitigate the effect of the same and, (iv) The CONTRACTOR has
given SSM prompt notice of the same in the manner described in the following
sentence. The CONTRACTOR shall submit to SSM all necessary information and
details relating to an event of Force Majeure and the consequences of the same no
later than 30 days after commencement of the event of Force Majeure. Failure to
so inform SSM shall constitute a waiver by the CONTRACTOR of any right to
claim Force Majeure (and the benefits of this Article 9) with respect to such
events. Notwithstanding the foregoing, SSM shall have the right to independently
investigate the nature and consequences of any alleged event of Force Majeure.
When an event of Force Majeure has in fact prevented performance of
CONTRACTOR's commitments hereunder, SSM shall extend the effectivity
period for a reasonable period of time depending upon the circumstances, and
CONTRACTOR shall not be liable for any penalties which would otherwise have
been assessed during the period of any such extension. However, all applicable
commitments shall be escalated during the period of any such extension.

9.2.

Force Majeure means, and shall be limited to, any of following events:

(Please contact SSM for this part of the document)
Article 10. Reporting and Meetings
10.1. The CONTRACTOR shall prepare and submit to SSM Semi-annual Development
Report on all realized exports and Annual Reports concerning all of its
commitments hereunder. The CONTRACTOR shall submit the Semi-annual
Development Reports to SSM within the first fifteen (15) days after the first six
(6) months of the applicable program year and shall submit the Annual Report to
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SSM within first thirty (30) days after the end of the program year relating to such
Annual Report.
10.1.1 The Semi-annual Development Reports shall include the following information:
a. the amount of US $ exports realized,
b. country and company to which such exports were made,
c. type and amount of the exported goods and services,
d. amount of Local Value Added constituting such exports,
e. name, title and addresses of Turkish producers of the exported goods and
services,
f. a certified copy of custom clearance declaration showing the realized export
value and a certificate of CONTRACTOR declaring that such export complies
with the requirements of this agreement.
10.1.2. The Annual Reports should contain the following information:
10.2. A working group designated by the parties shall meet at SSM's offices promptly
after this Agreement comes into effect in accordance with Article 15. Such
working group shall meet every six (6) months thereafter. The members of the
working group shall consist of at least one representative from each of SSM and
the CONTRACTOR. The subjects for discussion, recording and mutual
agreement shall include:
a. the total amount of each commitment achieved to date, and
b. the effect of the price escalation formula calculation on the amount of the
commitment for the following year.
Article 11. Control and Authority of Annulment
11.1. SSM shall at all times have the right to use either independent auditing firms or its
own personnel to audit the accounts, books and records of CONTRACTOR, all
Eligible Parties and/or their subcontractors with the objective of verifying the
realized commitments. SSM shall be responsible for all expenses incurred by it in
conducting such audits.
11.2. In the event any commitments are incorrectly credited, SSM shall have the right
to annul any such crediting within the offset program period, and shall notify the
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Eligible Party by letter, and if appropriate, a reasonable period of time for
realization of the annulled offset shall be granted.
Article 12 Termination of the PRIME CONTRACT
12.1. In the event that the PRIME CONTRACT is terminated for the default of the
CONTRACTOR, then CONTRACTOR and/or Eligible Party will maintain all
projects currently in place active and viable for the balance of ..........(...) year
Effectivity Period.
12.2.

In no event shall this agreement and/or CONTRACTOR's commitments
hereunder be affected or reduced if the contract is terminated for reasons
attributable to CONTRACTOR's default.

Article 13. Dispute Resolution and Applicable Law
13.1. This Agreement is made under and shall be governed by and construed in
accordance with the substantial and procedural laws of the Republic of Turkey
and shall not be governed by the laws of any other jurisdiction.
13.2. Both Parties hereto irrevocably submit to the jurisdiction of the courts of Ankara,
the Republic of Turkey in relation to any claim or dispute arising from this
Agreement and acknowledge their competence.
Article 14. Changes to be made in the Offset Agreement
14.1. SSM, at any time, has the right to amend this Offset Agreement partially or
completely.
Article 15. Effectiveness
This Agreement shall become effective on the date the PRIME CONTRACT comes
unconditionally into effect in accordance with its terms.
Article 16. Language
16.1. The contractual language is English.
16.2. This Agreement shall be written in both languages and only the English version
shall be legally binding.
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Article 17. Notices
Any notice to be given under this Agreement shall be deemed to be properly given if
left against receipt at or sent by registered mail to the parties of this agreement to the
party concerned at this address below, and shall be deemed to have been received and
effective on the tenth (10) working day following the posting thereof if sent by
registered mail.
NOTICE TO SSM:
SAVUNMA SANAYİİ MÜSTEŞARLIĞI,
İNÖNÜ BULVARI, KİRAZLIDERE MEVKİİ BAHÇELİEVLER 06100, ANKARA
TURKEY
TELEPHONE: 90 (312) 417 23 26
TELEFAX:
90 (312) 417 32 66
TELEX:
46377 Ssgd Tr
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